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et al.: Restitution for Consumer Fraud Under Section Five of the Federal

RESTITUTION FOR CONSUMER FRAUD
UNDER SECTION FIVE OF
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Trade Commission was created by Congress in
1914 to protect individuals and businesses from monopolies and
the unfair practices and methods of competition by which monopolies grow.' Almost from the outset, however, the agency has
policed against deceptive practices which affect consumers,2 even
though such "deceptive practices" were not expressly proscribed
by § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) until 1938.'
In recent years, the consumer movement and severe criticism from
1. 51 CONG. Ec. 11109, 11597 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands);
51 CONG. REC. 11455 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REC.
12372 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Hollis); 51 CONG. REc. 14936 (1914)
(remarks of Representative Stevens).
2. See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (sale
of inferior quality candy to children through lottery sales marketing scheme) ;
FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922) (deceptive labelling as
to fabric of underwear and other knit goods).
3. Under § 5 as enacted in 1914, "unfair methods of competition in
commerce are . . . declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
This proscription was expanded in 1938 to include "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" as well as "unfair methods of competition." 52 Stat. 111
(1938), amending 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1970).
Finally, Congress altered the Commission's jurisdiction in 1975 in
order to bring acts or practices "in or affecting commerce" within its scope.
88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
Presently, § 5, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
(a) (1)
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(6)
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations ...
from using unfair methods
of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
(b)
* * * If upon [al hearing the Commission shall be of the
opinion that the method of competition or the act or practice in
question is prohibited . . ., it shall . . . issue . . . an order requiring
such person . . . to cease and desist from using such method of competition or such act or practice.
88 Stat.
(1975),
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its leaders have forced the Commisson to invigorate consumer
protection efforts."
Today the FTC is imaginatively .using its broad power to define unfair and deceptive practices to rid the market of heretofore
untouched unfair acts.' One example of a newly defined unfair
practice is the undisclosed use of "mock-ups" for filming television
commercials. It has been declared unlawful to imply that a sand
and gel mixture on plexiglass is analogous to a lathered beard
for the purpose of advertising a shaving cream's moisturizing
qualities.'
The FTC's broad authority to prevent unfair and deceptive
practices is undergoing even more striking changes.' Empowered
by Congress to order violators of § 5 to cease and desist from engaging in disclosed unfair practices,' the Commission has been
afforded wide latitude to fashion remedies suited to prevent particular unfair practices." In the past, however, this remedial authority has generally appeared only in the form of cease and desist
orders. An order of this type, though requiring the violator to
discontinue his unfair practice, permitted him to retain any proceeds therefrom. Thus, a cease and desist order failed to remove
the incentive for a violator to develop another profitable and illegal
practice.
4. See Cox, Fellmeth and Schulz, The Consumer and the Federal Trade
Commission (1969) ("The Nader Report").
A reply to the Nader Report by Commissioner Paul Rand Dixon may
be found at 115 CONG. REc. 3345-47 (1969).
5. See, e.g., Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1965)
(pre-ticketing and advertising of products at manufacturer's list price when
retailers customarily sell at lower prices); William D. Campbell, Jr., 3
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,663 (FTC 1974) (bait and switch tactics); Pastime
Industries, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,615 (FTC 1974) (deceptive
packaging of toy, gift, and hobby products); Auslander Decorator Furniture, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,435 (FTC 1973) (failure to meet delivery dates, delivery of damages and defective goods, and unsatisfactory repair
of goods) ; Pfizer, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1120,056 (FTC 1972) (advertiser making affirmative claims for a product without a reasonable basis for
making such claims).
6. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
7. See Bower, New Developments in FTC Remedies, 41 ANTITRusT L.J.
465 (1972); Note, Consumer Protection-Remedies of the Federal Trade
Commission-Expansion to Include Limitations of Contracts, 47 TUL. L. REV.
436 (1973); Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection
Orders, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 496 (1972); Note, "Corrective Advertising"
Orders of the FTC, 85 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1971).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
9. See notes 90-102 infra and accompanying text.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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To remove the incentive to violate § 5, the FTC has been developing new orders which either limit the unscrupulous operator's
"take" or completely deprive him of it. The new remedies which
have already received court'approval include: affirmative advertising, which requires a false advertiser to disclose the true nature
or efficiency of a product;1" requiring a person under a cease and
desist order to give refunds to all customers injured after the effective date of the order by re-use of proscribed practices;" limiting
the amount of contractual indebtedness which providers of certain
consumer services, such as dancing lessons, can cause a consumer to
incur;2 antitrust divestiture;' 3 and mandatory licensing of pat10. J.B. Williams, Inc. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (manufacturer required to disclose that its non-prescription drug will not affect
tiredness in the great majority of people because most people's tiredness is
caused by something other than the deficiency which the drug remedies);
Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960) (baldness
treatment must disclose that it cannot cure male pattern baldness, the
source of 90-95% of all male baldness); Bantum Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1960) (abridged or retitled books must be clearly so
labeled) ; Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1960)
(a similar baldness treatment case) ; Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318 (7th
Cir. 1959) (another treatment for baldness); Mary Muffet, Inc. v. FTC,
194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952) (rayon or silk content of fabric must be disclosed); L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951) (imported
imitation pearl necklaces must disclose their foreign origin); In re Hillman
Periodicals, Inc. v. FTC, 44 FTC 832 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 174 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1949) (abridged books must be so labeled clearly and conspiciously);
Haskelyte Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942) (wooden trays
with paper surfaces must be so labeled and cannot be advertised simply as
"wood" trays); Shaklee Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. q20,695 (FTC 1974)
(purchasers of a food supplement in age groups to whom the supplement
may be dangerous and at whom an advertising campaign was aimed must be
warned of the supplement's detrimental effects); Forever Young, Inc., 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 120,649 (FTC 1974) (manufacturer of chemical, facial
wrinkle and blemish remover required to disclose inherent dangers and limitions of product); Union Carbide Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
20,584
(FTC 1974) (agricultural insecticide manufacturer required to disclose danger
of chemicals subsequent to advertising campaign describing insecticide as nontoxic and hazard-free to man and his environment).
11. Windsor Distributing Co. v. FTC, 437 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1971).
12. Arthur Murray Studio of Washington, Inc., 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.
1972); Overseas Alaska Personnel Ass'n, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
20,433
(FTC 1973).
13. Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1
(7th Cir. 1971) ; In re Ekco Products Co., 65 FTC 1163, 1212-17 (1964). Cf.
Produced
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ents. 4 Many additional orders have also been fashioned by the
FTC, although they have not to date received specific judicial
sanction. "
14. Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); American Cynamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757
(6th Cir. 1966).
15. Corrective advertising has been considered and ordered on several
occasions. Such an order requires an advertiser to spend a percentage of
a prior false advertising campaign's cost or to allocate a percentage of
advertising space in future advertising campaigns in order to correct any
misconceptions engendered by former misrepresentations. See, e.g., WarnerLambert Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.

t-

(FTC 1975);

Ocean Spray

Cranberries, Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7 20,051
(FTC 1972); Matsushita Electric of Hawaii, Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer
Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7f19,430 (FTC 1971); Bristol-Myers Co.,
20,263 (FTC 1973)
(1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
(complaint issued). For examples of cases where the FTC initially considered
ordering corrective advertising, but subsequently determined that the order
was not warranted, see The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,112 (FTC 1972) (wherein the FTC
fully sets forth its legal analysis of corrective advertising) ; ITT Continental Baking Co., Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
719,539 (FTC 1971) (proposed complaint); American Home Products
Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. t19,673 (FTC
1971) (proposed complaint).
The Commission frequently orders "cooling-off" periods during which
consumers may rescind sales contracts with full right of refund. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Chemical Corp., Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. t 20,631 (FTC
1974) (10 day); Lincoln Upholstry Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,586
(FTC 1974) (3 day); Household Sewing Machine Co., Inc. (1967-1970 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
18,882 (FTC 1969) (leading case);
Circulation Builders, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,724 (FTC 1974)
(proposed complaint).
The Commission has also ordered violators to send informational mailings to previous customers when necessary to fully effectuate the terms of
the order against them. See, e.g., Tax Corp. of America (Maryland), 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 20,753 (FTC 1974); GAC Finance, Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,057 (FTC 1972).
On occasion the FTC has required that the violator's employees be
provided with copies of the order against the employer; that the employees
read the order; and, that the employer insure the employees' adherence to
the order. See, e.g., Publishers Continental Sales Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer
Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. I 19,886 (FTC 1971); Mather Hearing Aid
Distributors, Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
19,627 (FTC 1971); Crown Chinchilla Associates, (1970-1973 Transfer
Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,467 (FTC 1971).
The Commission has even ordered reinstatement of employees or distributors who were fired pursuant to a policy later forbidden by the cease
and desist order. See, e.g., Fashion Two Twenty, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. I 20,432 (FTC 1973); Erie Foundary Co., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder)
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,683 (FTC 1971).
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The most innovative and perhaps the most sweeping and effective order which the FTC has recently fashioned in cases of
patent consumer fraud is restitution.' 6 Restitution, which is not
specifically sanctioned by § 5, is justified by the Commission under
the agency's broad remedial power and its authority to define un16. Although consumer refunds were ordered in three cases in the
1940's, this authority was not again asserted on a regular basis until the
1970's. Interstate Home Equipment Co., 62 FTC 260 (1945); In re Cookware Associates, 40 FTC 260 (1945); Success Portrait Co., 35 FTC 227
(1942).
Now the FTC is using restitution to prevent many types of consumer
fraud. Deceptive recruitment of franchises and members for phony business
schemes has been a recurring type. See Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE
REG. REP. 20,757 (FTC 1974), modified, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. %20,819
(FTC 1975) (pyramid sales scheme); Universal Credit Acceptance Corp.,
(1970-1973 Transfer Binder)

CCH TRADE REG. REP.

20,240

(FTC 1973),

rev'd sub nom., Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974); Soundarama
Marketing Co., Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
720,041 (FTC 1972); Koscott Interplanetary, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 20,902 (FTC 1975) (initial decision) (pyramid sales scheme); Universal Electronics, Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 19,479 (FTC 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-1187 (8th Cir. Aug. 19,
1971).
Mail order companies which solicit orders by false advertisements have
been ordered to restore consumers' money when the goods are never sent, or
are sent only after excessive delay. See Alaska Sleeping Bag Co., (19701973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,982 (FTC 1972); Defa
Electronics Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
1 19,743 (FTC 1971).
Price discriminations resulting from promotional campaigns have also
drawn restitution orders. See Kroger Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. I 20,396
(FTC 1973); Buy Rite, (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
1 20,051 (FTC 1972).
Career training schools which have attracted students by grossly misrepresenting the value of the offered training and the effectiveness of their
placement services have repeatedly been subject to restitution proceedings.
See Lear Seigler, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. %20,938 (FTC 1975) ; Maralco
Enterprises, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 720,890 (FTC 1975); Weaver
Airline Personnel School, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[20,756 (FTC
1974); Fuque Industries, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,755 (FTC
1974); United Systems, Inc., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE
REQ. REP. I20,049 (FTC 1972); Soundtract Chevell Industries, Inc., 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. %20,771 (FTC 1974) (complaint); Lafayette United Corp.,
3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 7f 20,499 (FTC 1974) (proposed complaint); Control Data Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,980
(FTC 1972) (proposed complaint).
The FTC is also using its § 5 restitution power to remedy violations of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970). See
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., et al., 3 CCH TRADE REQ. REP. I 20,859
(FTC 1975) (unused credits in revolving charge accounts lost if not used
within several years); Credit Arrangers, (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH
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fair acts and practices." The retention of purchase money by one
who has deceptively sold utterly worthless goods or services to a
consumer is defined as an unfair practice under the FTCA. This
unfair practice is deemed to continue until the purchase money is
returned. By ordering the seller to cease and desist the unfair
retention, the seller is, in fact, ordered to restore the purchase
money to the consumer. By so exercising its defining authority, the
Commission effectively orders restitution. In addition and as an
aspect of the Commission's broad remedial powers, restitution is
defended as the only order adequate to prevent the violator from
engaging in further consumer fraud. Restitution, like divestiture,
restores the pre-violation status quo and deprives the violator of his
ill-gotten gains. In the area of consumer fraud, restitution is particularly necessary because only an order which removes the incentive to engage in such conduct can deter future violations of the
FTCA. The traditional cease and desist order is inadequate because
of its failure to reach the operator's profits and to go beyond denying him the use of former lucrative schemes.
Unlike the other new definitions and orders whose validity have
been contested and approved in the courts, the power of the FTC
TRADE REG. REP.
19,871 (FTC 1971) (debt adjusting agency took money
from clients but, instead of paying bills, kept the money).
Restitution has been ordered for land development frauds. See GAC
Finance, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,554 (FTC 1974) (swamp land
sold as ready to build on); Great Northern Development Co., (1970-1973
Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,046 (FTC 1972) (proposed
complaint).
In addition, restitution has been ordered to prevent a variety of other
consumer frauds. See Payless Drug Stores Northwest, Inc., (1970-1973
Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,302 (FTC 1973) (purchasers
of "world's safest" motorcycle helmet allowed to get their money back);
Circulation Builders, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
20,724 (FTC 1974)
(proposed complaint) (door-to-door magazine sales company which kept subscribers' money without ordering subscriptions); Coca-Cola Co., (1970-1973
Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
19,633 (FTC 1971) (hearing
examiner refusing to dismiss complaint) (promotional scheme did not give

out all the prizes that a reasonable person would have expected).
17. The FTC has explained this unfair method of competition and
its remedy in two opinions. Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., (19701973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,240 (FTC 1973), rev'd
sub nom., Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974); and Curtis Publishing Co., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REc. REP.

119,719 (FTC

1971).
The arguments against the interpretation of the FTCA asserted by the
Commission in Universal and Curtis may be found in the Initial Decision of
Curtis, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,376, 78 FTC 1472, 1497-507 (FTC
1970).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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to order restitution has been denied. Heater v. FederalTrade Commission,'" which, as of this writing, is the sole judicial determination of the issue, held that the FTC exceeds its statutory authority
when it orders restitution.
This note will demonstrate, by a thorough examination of
the legislative history of the FTCA and judicial utterances in cases
other than Heater, that the FTC, by itself does have the authority
to order restitution. In particular, it will be argued that such
authority stems from the Commission's broad powers both to define
and to prevent unfair acts and practices. Further, it will be shown
that certain limitations upon FTC orders which have been traditionally imposed by courts are not violated by a restitution order.
The note will conclude with a discussion of the recently enacted
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 9 which empowers the FTC to seek consumer redress in
either federal or state courts, and with an examination of the
propriety of FTC ordered restitution from a policy standpoint. Familiarity with a factual setting in which the FTC decreed restitution will facilitate an understanding of the legal grounds for the
FTC's jurisdiction to order restitution. Heater provides such a
setting.
HEATER V. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

John Clifford Heater organized, directed and owned a series of
corporations which operated "Honor All Credit Cards" programs
in California between the years 1953 and 1972.2 Under these programs, small retail merchants were enabled to accept charges on
any of the major oil and bank credit cards as payment for goods
or services. After accepting a sale on a credit card, the charges
were sent to one of the Heater corporations for payment and collection. Corporate income was to be realized from the sale of exclusive territorial sales rights to sales representatives, who in turn
sold memberships to retailers. Sales representatives invested on the
average about $7,000, while the individual member-merchants were
obligated to pay a moderate initial sum, monthly dues and a small
percentage of each sale made under the program ("discount fees").
18. 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
19. 88 Stat. 2183, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970).
20. The facts set forth in this section are recounted in the FTC's
opinion for Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder)
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,240, 82 FTC 570, 642-68 (1973), and in the
Initial Decision of Universal, (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE: REG.
REP. 119,938, 82 FTC 570, 582-642 (1972).
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The benefits of both the territorial sales rights and the memberships were grossly misrepresented by the companies. Few of
the promised benefits ever came to fruition. The program was
promoted as non-recourseable, financially sound, nationally accepted, and "guaranteed to increase the retailer's profits." In
reality, the Heater programs were fully recourseable local operations which ran on much tighter budgets than advertised. Instead
of reaping greater profits, many members suffered losses. Despite
having purchased a two year term, most members stopped using
Mr. Heater's questionable service after eight months.
The exclusive sales representatives fared no better. These representatives were induced by inflated profit-projection sheets and
the promise of receiving unworked or previously profitable territories in which to market the "easy to sell" program. Yet only three
percent (3%) of the sales representatives recouped their initial investment; the average representative losing about eighty-one percent (81%) of it.
Upon complaint to investigate the Heater operation and subsequent to an evidentiary hearing, the FTC ordered restitution against
the corporations. Not only was the worthless nature of Mr. Heater's
service apparent from the members' and sales representatives' financial records, but, more damaging was evidence which clearly
indicated that Mr. Heater and his associates were aware all along
of the high rate of failure.2
The administrative law judge
concluded,
the record establishes that these respondents perpetrated
a scheme fraught with misrepresentations from which
they try to insulate themselves by using devious contractual language, not intended or likely to be read and
not clearly understandable, even if actually read. Respondents have clearly calculated the program to enrich
only themselves at the expense of innocent small businessmen lured into it as members and franchisees."
All franchise fees, membership fees, dues and discount fees received by Mr. Heater's corporations between January 1, 1967 and
February 16, 1973 were to be restored. Furthermore, since Mr.
Heater was found to be the alter ego of the bankrupt corporations,
the restitution order also ran against him personally.
21.
22.

82 FTC 570, 627-31 (1972).
Id. at 584.
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On appeal, however, the restitution provision was reversed."
Without reaching the alter ego issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that in decreeing restitution the FTC exceeded its
authority both to define unfair acts or practices and to prevent
violations of this type. The restrictive view of the Commission's
authority taken in Heater strikes directly at the doctrinal underpinning of the new FTC consumer protection orders-that the
FTC has the inherent power of a court of equity.2 " In so doing, use
and development of consumer protection orders based on the equitable principle are threatened. Thus, Heater stands as an obstacle
to an agency which its creators had hoped to be able to prevent
unfairness in the market.
SOURCES OF THE

FTC's

AUTHORITY TO ORDER RESTITUTION

Congress' avowed purpose for creating the FTC in 1914 was
to protect society from the unrestrained effects of selfishness which
appear in the form of unfair methods of competition.2" Section 5 (a)
of the original FTCA declares "unfair methods of competition" to
be "unlawful." 26 Further, it states that "the Commission is empowered and directed to prevent" the use of such methods in commerce."'
In order to enforce a fairness standard, § 5 (b) grants the FTC the
power to order a violator to "cease and desist" from engaging in
the unfair conduct. 8
Congress clarified the purpose of the FTC in 1938 by enacting
the Wheeler-Lea Amendment." Although the FTC had from its
inception endeavored to protect individuals as well as businesses,'*
a restrictive United States Supreme Court decision made it necessary to specify that the FTC could properly seek the protection of
consumers, even in cases where no injury to competition is in23. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974).
24. Hearings on the Nomination of Paul Rand Dixon, for Reappointment to the Federal Trade Commission Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-116, at 185, 189-90 (1974) (remarks of
Commissioner Dixon).
25. 51 CONG. REc. 12742 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Cummins).
See 51 CONG. REC. 11106, 11385, 12733 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REC. 11109, 11597 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands).
26. FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §45(a)

(1970).
27. FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
28. Id.
29.
(1934).

SO.

15 U.S.C.

§§41-46 and 47-58,

amending 15 U.S.C.

See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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volved.' The Wheeler-Lea Amendment illuminated the FTC's mission by declaring unlawful any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 2 Statements by the Amendment's supporters and the committee reports made it clear that the FTC was to be as concerned
with the interests of consumers as it was with those of businessmen. " Today, Congress still demands that the FTC play an active
role in consumer protection. 4
So that the Commission might accomplish its purpose, both
Congress and courts have afforded the agency broad powers to
define unfair methods of competition and unfair practices and to
fashion orders adequate to prevent their recurrence. It is from these
powers that the FTC argues that restitution authority properly
derives. Examination of congressional debates and judicial utterances support this contention.
Wrongful Retention as an Unfair Practice
The first ground upon which the FTC bases its authority, to
order restitution is that the fraudulent operator acts unfairly within the purview of § 5 by retaining the money which was acquired
from the deceptive sale of a worthless good or service." Independent
from the deceptive sales practices, the seller's refusal to terminate
his unjust enrichment under a cloak of legality is itself defined as
an unfair act. The violation continues until the purchase price is
returned to the cheated consumer because it is "unfair" to retain
such money. By defining the failure of the fraudulent seller to
return the swindled consumer's money as a continuing unfair practice, the FTC can accomplish restitution with its traditional remedial device-a cease and desist order. As with any other violation,
the unfair act or practice is ended by ordering the actor to cease and
31.
32.

FTC v. Raladim Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970), amending FTCA, 15

U.S.C. §45 (a)

(1934).

33. 83 CONG. REC. 391-92 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea); 83
CONG. REc. 3255 (1938) (remarks of Senator Wheeler); H.R. REP. No. 1613,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3

(1936).
34. On February 5, 1973, Senator Stevens commanded Commissioner
Engman that "[t]he direction that Congress has mandated for the FTC

to take is to become the most active consumer advocate of the federal government." Hearings on the Nomination of Lewis A. Engman, to be a Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, Before the Senate Committee on Cominerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-15, at 30 (1973). See note 53 infra and
accompanying text.
35. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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desist. Yet, in this case, by ordering the fraudulent seller to cease
holding the consumer's money, the seller's unjust enrichment is
ended and the money is restored to the consumer."
Although conceding that defining the sellers unjust enrichment
as an independent unfair practice "reflects a not implausible construction of the Act," the Heater court rejected the Commission's
understanding of its power to so define unfair acts or practices. 7
Based upon its reading of the legislative history, the court classified the seller's retention of the spoils as a "secondary effect" of
an unfair practice, rather than as a separate unfair practice."'
Reasoning that the FTC does not have the power to remedy the
secondary effects of unfair acts or practices but only to prevent
the unfair practices themselves, the court held wrongful retention
to be beyond the FTC's jurisdiction.39 In contrast to the Heater
court's reasoning stand the legislative history of the FTCA and
prior judicial utterances concerning the FTC.
The FTC, by its very nature and intended purpose, must be
accorded broad judicial deference in the defining of unfair acts or
practices. In 1914 Congress felt that the courts were too illequipped to act with the speed and effectiveness necessary to prevent unfair methods of competition.4 A non-partisan administra36. Id.
37. 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. Id. at 322.
39. Id. at 323-24.
40. 51 CONG. REC. 11109 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51
CONG. REC. 11235 (1914) (remarks of Senator Pomerene); 51 CONG. REC.
11593 (1914) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury); 51 CoNG. REC. 14933-34
(1914) (remarks of Representative Stevens).
When referring to the 1914 congressional debates, the words "unfair
competition" and "unfair methods of competition" are used interchangeably.
As originally proposed and debated, § 5 outlawed the former. See 51 CONG.
REC. 14923 (1914). Although the conference committee on the FTCA substituted the latter phrase, members of that committee, in debate, explained
that there is no difference in meaning between the two. 51 CONG. REC. 14768
(1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins). See 51 CONG. REc. 14769 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Pomerene).
Although technically there might be a distinction between the type of
activity included in "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair acts or
practices," [see FTC v. Raladim, 283 U.S. 643 (1931); but see FTC v. R.F.
Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258
U.S. 483 (1922)], the definitions and attributes which the 1914 Congress
gave to the unfairness standard itself and to the agency generally are applicable equally to both proscriptions. Had the Congress which passed the
Wheeler-Lea Act intended otherwise, it certainly would have chosen a
standard different from that of the original § 5. In any event, neither has
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whether a particular method was unfair."2 Although
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experts, was
employing its
first instance
the unfairness

of a practice was ultimately to be a question for the courts,"' the
FTC's findings of fact were to be subject to only limited review
and its determinations of unfairness were to be given great
weight."
The necessity that a reviewing court treat the FTC's determinations with deference derives also from the open-textured nature
of the unfairness standard." By choosing this broad standard,
Congress rejected the approach of listing specific prohibited unfair
methods of competition. The flexible unfairness standard, rather
than a laundry list type statute, was chosen to prevent circumvention by ingenious businessmen always able to devise unfair practices different from those proscribed. 6 Proponents of the Act
the Supreme Court nor the court in Heater questioned the applicability of the
1914 legislative history to the definition of the Wheeler-Lea Act's standard.
See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchison Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); FTC
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1965); Heater v. FTC, 503
F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). Cf. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S.
304, 314 (1934).
41. 51 CONG. REC. 11092 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51
CONG. REC. 14924 (1914) (conference committee report to House). See 51
CONG. REc. 14927 (1914) (remarks of Representative Covington).
42. 51 CONG. REC. 10376 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51
CONG. REC. 14928 (1914) (remarks of Representative Green).
43. FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970), as amended.
44. Id. See 51 CONG. REC. 11104 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REC. 11103-04 (1914) (remarks of Senators Works and
Cummins).
45. Handler, The Jurisdiction of the FTC over False Advertising, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 532, 534 (1931).

46. The reports of the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, the
committee which drafted the original version of § 5, and the conference
committees make clear Congress' preference for a broad and flexible concept. The Interstate Commerce Committee's report states:
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as
to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair
practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their continuance
or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair
practices, leave it to the Commission to determine what practices
were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the
better, for the reason .

.

. that there were too many unfair practices

to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be
quite possible to invent others.
S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See H.R. REP. No. 1142,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914).
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also expressed the hope that the standard would grow and evolve to
meet society's changing needs.4" A common concern to many senators was the prevention of business acts which contravened good
public morals."8 Thus, many of the definitions given for "unfair
competition" included any act recognized as unjust by courts of
law or equity."' For example, Senator Newlands, the chairman of
the Committee on Commerce, the committee which wrote the FCTA,
and the floor leader during the Senate debates, concluded:
This tribunal is simply for the purpose of economically
giving to each individual, at the lowest cost of effort and
money, the power of asserting his right which exists at
law or in equity.5"
Agreeing with Senator Newlands, Senator Robinson, another member of the Commerce Committee, defined unfair competition as
"every practice which may be held by a court to be unjust, inequitable, or dishonest. . . ."" For Senatot Colt, an opponent of
47. The remarks of both senators and representatives indicate that § 5
was to have an evolutionary character. Senator Cummins declared that:
"The trade commission becomes bound to declare what is . . . unfair competition according . . . to the improving and developing sense of the
country . . . ." 51 CONG. REC. 11104 (1914). Senator Newlands, describing

§ 5, stated: "Legal terms are elastic. The common law would not be what
it is if it had not adapted itself to new conditions and circumstances." 51
CONG. REC. 12211 (1914). Senator Cummins most clearly described the
evolutionary nature of § 5: "the words 'unfair competition' can grow and
broaden and mold themselves to meet the circumstances as they arise . . .
in order to meet the necessities of the American people." 51 CONG. REC.
12871 (1914). Representative Covington also noted that:
[W]e could not take away from the courts, the power to expand the
law in respect to "unfair competition" . . . and to make "unfair

competition" a vital elastic principle of the law, which is the only
thing that makes the developing process of the common law worth
having in this country.
51 CONG. REC. 14928 (1914). Similar statements may be found at: 51 CONG.
REC. 11179 (1914) (remarks of Senators Hollis and Sutherland); 51 CONG.
REC. 11107, 11108 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51 CONG. REc.
13048 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
48. 51 CONG. REC. 11379 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51
CONG. REC. 11109, 12939, 12980, 13116 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51 CONG. REC. 8854 (1914) (remarks of Representative Morgan).
49. 51 CONG. REC. 12939 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51
CONG. REc. 12028 (1914) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury).
50. 51 CONG. REC. 11109 (1914). See 51 CONG. REC. 11597 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands).
51.- 51 CONG. REc. 11107 (1914). See 51 CONG. REc. 11228 (1914) (reRobinson).
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the FCTA, unfair competition meant "transactions in a way colored
by fraud."52
Summarizing, the Heater court's refusal to recognize the
fraudulent operator's retention of money as an unfair practice
stands in conflict with legislative descriptions of the equitable and
flexible nature of the FTC's power to define unfair competition and
unfair practices. Given the Commission's power to prevent practices recognized as unfair by courts of law or equity, clearly a
practice which constitutes unjust enrichment should fall within
the scope of the FTC's authority. In addition, the § 5 standard
was to grow to meet society's changing needs. That Congress
recognized the necessity of protecting consumers is apparent from
the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment and other consumer
legislation, the enforcement of which is entrusted to the FTC."
It is untenable to argue that Congress intended to allow fraudulent
operators to profit unfairly at the expense of consumers in the
face of the fact that an expert agency was created expressly to
prevent unfairness of this type. This is particularly true where
the type of unfairness with which the FTC was to deal was cast
in such broad terms.
Moreover, the restrictive Heater decision is also inconsistent
with prior judicial determinations recognizing the flexibility and
broadness of the unfairness standard. The courts have accorded
the FTC wide discretion to define unfair practices."' This judicial
deference is exemplified by the United States Supreme Court's ac52. 51 CONG. REC. 12653 (1914).
53. Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970) (false advertising of food,
drugs, devices and cosmetics); Wool Products Labelling Act, 15 U.S.C.
§68(a) (1970); Fur Products Labelling Act, 15 U.S.C. §69(a) (1970);
Textile Fiber Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70(a) (1970); Lanham TradeMark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1191-1204 (1970); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970); Fair Packaging and Labelling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (1970);
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title I (Truth-in-Lending Act), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-07 (1970); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title VI (Fair Credit
Reporting Act), 15 U.S.C. §1681 (1970); National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
54. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320 (1966) (the FTC has
broad powers to declare trade practices unfair); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 720
(1948); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); Luria
Bros. Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847, 860 (3d Cir. 1968); American Cynamid Co.
v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 769 (6th Cir. 1966). See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1953).
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ceptance of several innovative FTC definitions of unfairness. Prior
to Congress' express outlawing of deceptive practices in the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, the Court had affirmed a FTC order
requiring a clothing manufacturer to cease deceptively labeling
its products.5" Similarly, the Court agreed that the gambling-marketing scheme used by a manufacturer to sell inferior quality candy
to children was unfair, even though only a moral injury resulted."
More recently, the Supreme Court has continued to recognize the
FTC's broad power to define unfair practices. 7 The receptiveness
to innovation which has characterized the United States Supreme
Court in the above mentioned opinions certainly was not shared by
the Heater court.
In the Supreme Court's most recent review of the unfairness
standard, the Court, like the Congresses of 1914 and 1937-38,"'
opted for a broad interpretation. The Court in FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 9 was convinced by,
legislative and judicial authority alike . . . that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive
power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness,
it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond
simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the
spirit of the antitrust laws."0
In a footnote to the preceding quotation, the Court quoted with
approval the FTC's expansive definition of unfairness:
55. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922).
56. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). The
Court's words illustrate the moral injury involved.
A method of competition which casts upon one's competitors the
burden of the loss of business unless they will descend to a practice
which they are under a powerful moral compulsion not to adopt,
even though it is not criminal, was thought to involve the kind of
unfairness at which the statute was aimed.

Id. at 313.
57. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965) (oppressive use of bargaining position by major oil company to force gasoline
retailers to sell Goodyear auto accessories); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374 (1965) (deceptive television advertisement mock-up). Cf. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (monopoly
of commercial air and land transportation).
58. See notes 40-53 supra and accompanying text.
59. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).

60.TheId.
at 244.
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The Commission has described the factors it considers
in determining whether a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive is nonetheless
unfair:
"(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public
policy as it has been established by statutes, the common
law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within
at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory or
other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3)
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or to
competitors or other businessmen).""6

It is contended that the retention of a consumer's money from
the sale of a worthless good or service is an unfair practice within
the above quoted passages from Sperry & Hutchinson. The FTC
is specifically exhorted by the Court to include within the concept of
unfairness those acts which a court of equity considers unfair.
As in the legislative definition, unjust enrichment must, therefore, be considered an unfair practice within the meaning of
§ 5. Applying the factors enumerated in the Court's footnote yields
the same result. The public policy of preventing consumer fraud
is inhibited by allowing the seller to retain the proceeds of a
fraudulent sale. The common law actions for deceit, general assumpsit, and the equitable suit for restitution, which works a
rescission of contract, all attest to the existence of such a policy. It
is submitted that such retention is indisputably, using the words of
Sperry & Hutchinson, "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous." In addition, consumers and competitors can suffer substantial injury, depending upon the amount of money acquired by the
fraudulent operator.
In sum, both legislative history and judicial utterances support the contention that the fraudulent operator's retention of consumer money is an unfair trade practice within § 5 of the FTCA.
In contrast to the Heater court's characterization of the unfair
retention as a mere "secondary effort," stands the flexible nature
of the unfairness standard and the equitable scope of the FTC's
jurisdiction. Restitution, in addition to being justified as an ad61. Id. at 244-45 n.5, quoting from Statement of Basis and Purpose of
Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling
of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 FED. REG. 8355
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
(1964).
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junct to the FTC's broad power to define unfair practices, can also
be shown to be within the FTC's authority to fashion whatever
remedies are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the FTCA.
The Prevention of Consumer Fraud
The second ground supporting the Commission's authority to
order restitution is the agency's broad authority to fashion orders
adequate for preventing unfair acts and practices. Legislative
history reveals that the FTC was created to protect individual
consumers and businessmen from being injured by unfair methods
of competition.2 Consumer fraud harms consumers and honest
competitors in both direct and indirect ways. Consumers suffer
a direct loss when they pay for a worthless good or service and
cannot obtain a refund. Likewise, the injury to an honest businessman is direct when consumer dollars are diverted from his products to those of deceptive vendors. Indirectly, both the consumer
and the honest businessman are injured by the increased capital
which is at the disposal of the fraudulent operator. With that capital, he may increase the heist and thereby strengthen his relative
competitive position vis-h-vis honest competitors. Alternatively
he may branch out into new fraudulent schemes, thereby injuring
the same or other businessmen. Whatever is done with the capital,
the consumer ultimately suffers.
Moreover, restitution is the only remedy which is adequate to
prevent future recurrences of consumer fraud. In contrast, a
cease and desist order, which forbids the fraudulent operator from
again employing a particular practice, does not make other schemes
for bilking the public less attractive. One who, for example, sells
swamp land as suitable for homesites,"3 is hardly the kind of
person to be deterred from developing a new fraudulent scheme
when the FTC issues an order which allows him to keep the profit
from the last one." Restitution, like antitrust divestiture and af62. 51 CONG. REc. 11106, 11385, 12733, 12742 (1914) (remarks of
Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REC. 11109, 11597 (1914) (remarks of Senator
Newlands).
63. GAC Corp., 3 CCH TRAmE REG. REP. 1120,554 (FTC 1974).
64. An example of the type of fraudulent operator who is not deterred
by a cease and desist order is the late William Penn Patrick. Mr. Patrick
was the developer and prime mover of Holiday Magic, Inc. Holiday Magic
was a pyramidal sales chain whereby Mr. Patrick and his associates were
enriched at the expense of those who bought into the operation, yet who
had little chance of success. When one of his associates, Mr. Ben Gay, a
past president of Holiday Magic, suggested that the corporation "compromise"
with
the Berkeley
FTC, Mr.
Patrick
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firmative advertising, orders which are within the Commission's
authority, restores the parties to their pre-violation positions and
thereby eliminates the incentive to engage in consumer fraud. 5 The
fraudulent operator is forced to return the money to consumers
who then can spend it according to a fair product selection. Concurrently, any ill-acquired capital advantage over honest competitors is relinquished. This result cannot be accomplished by a nonrestitutionary cease and desist order. So long as consumer fraud
is profitable, future injury to consumers and honest businessmen
is certain. Only an order which reaches the fraudulent operator's
gains, and thereby removes the incentive to defraud, can adequately prevent future consumer fraud. Restitution is well designed to accomplish this end. Whether the FTC can issue such an
eminently useful order, depends on the breadth of the FTC's
remedial powers.
Generally courts tend to imply the existence of those powers
which are necessary for the accomplishment of an administrative
agency's purpose." In Pan American World Airways v. United
Let's get something straight. I can steal more money in the next
two years than you can make building an organization [in twenty
years]. It is going to take the Federal Trade Commission two years
to get us and we will proceed on that line.
Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,757 n.12 (FTC 1974).
65. See Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110
(1948). In Schine, the Court ordered divestiture where enforcement of the
pertinent Act would otherwise be "futile," even though the Act did not
authorize divestiture as a means of enforcement. Underlying the Court's
action was its analogy of divestiture to restitution.
Like restitution [divestiture] merely deprives a defendant of the
gains from his wrongful conduct. It is an equitable remedy designed
in the public interest to undo what could have been prevented had the
defendants not outdistanced the government in their unlawful project.
Id. at 128.
With restitution, the FTC is laboring under the same considerations as
the Court in Schine-the futility of enforcement with presently approved
remedies. The only difference between the Commission and the Schine Court
is that the Commission has the authority to order divestiture from the
outset and must have the authority to order restitution subsequently implied, rather than vice versa.
66. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968) ; American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 387 U.S. 397, 406-13 (1967); FTC v.
Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 607 (1966); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S.
505, 518 (1963); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 311-12 (1963); United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590
(1957) ; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) ; National Petroleum Refiner's Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4

et al.: Restitution for Consumer Fraud Under Section Five of the Federal

19761

RESTITUTION FOR CONSUMER FRAUD

States," the United States Supreme Court apparently indicated its
criterion for recognizing implied agency authority: "Where the
problem lies within the purview of the Board, . . . Congress must
have intended to give it authority that was ample to deal with the
evil at hand."68 In Pan Am, the Court passed on the remedial authority of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) under § 411 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.8 Noting that § 411 is modeled after
§ 5 of the FTCA, interpretation of the former was consciously
influenced by previous construction of the latter."' The CAB's
cease and desist power was found to be broad enough to include the
ordering of divestiture."' Apparently acknowledging the equitable
authority of the CAB and the FTC, the Supreme Court "analogized
the power of administrative agencies to fashion appropriate relief
72
to the power of the courts * * * to frame injunctive decrees ....
The various provisions of the FTCA have not been denied their
share of generous judicial constructions. Without specific statutory authority, the FTC has been allowed to seek preliminary injunctions to protect the integrity of its proceedings ;73 to enforce
§ 7 of the Clayton Act " against vertical as well as horizontal
monopolies ;71 to require compliance reports from certain violators ;"' to make substantive rules ;" and to require affirmative action to remedy § 5 violations,"8 such as in antitrust divestiture 9 and
Cir. 1951). But see Textile and Apparel Group, Am. Importers Ass'n v.
FTC, 410 F.2d 1052, 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 910 (1969);
FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255, 258-61 (9th Cir. 1964).
67. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
68. Id. at 312.
69. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970).
70. 371 U.S. 296, 306-08 (1963).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 312 n.17.
73. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (The result was
reached despite unsuccessful appeals to and attempts in Congress to empower the FTC to seek preliminary injunctions.).
74. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970).
75. United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (The Court
reached its result despite prior FTC statements to the contrary and unsuccessful attempts to expressly acquire the authority from Congress prior to
initiation of this litigation.).
76. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
77. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
78. Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1968).
79.TheSee
noteElectronic
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affirmative advertising disclosure orders.8" Thus it is plain that

the courts tend to read liberally an agency's authorizing statute in
order to ratify a power which is necessary for the agency to accomplish its purpose. The FTCA is not excepted, nor does anything in the legislative history of the FTCA bar the finding of an
implied power to order restitution.
Little can be gleaned from either the FTCA or the 1914 and
1937-38 debates" on the question of restitution, other than the
fact that the agency was intended to have broad powers. Nowhere
in the FTCA is restitution for § 5 violations expressly prescribed.
Nor did the subject arise in the debates. 2 It is true that Congress
80. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
81. The 1914 congressional debates can be found at 51 CONG. REC. 6648,
6714, 7598, 8840-65, 8973-97, 9045-68, 9909-10, 9929, 10376-78, 11038, 11081116, 11173-89, 11224-25, 11228-37, 11298-307, 11378-89, 11447-58, 11528-43,
11591-604, 11622-23, 11685, 11862, 11870, 11876, 12022-32, 12141-56, 12168,
12208-22, 12272-82, 12355-421, 12482-84, 12538-51, 12601-02, 12617-55, 1272447, 12786-817, 12853-75, 12910-40, 12978-13007, 13044-67, 13100-22, 13143-66,
13206-19, 13222-35, 13297-319, 13438-39, 13450, 14714, 14764-72, 14784-802,
14918-43, 14934, 15019, 15044, 15190, 16317 (1914).
The committee reports may be found at H.R. REP. No. 533, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914); S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP.
No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
The Wheeler-Lea Act debates of 1937-38 can be found at 81 CONG. REC.
337, 2419, 2614, 2740, 2805, 2807, 2931, 9411 (1937); 83 CONG. REc. 391-424,
445, 1895, 3287-93 (1938).
The Wheeler-Lea Act committee reports are located at S. REP. No.
221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937) ; H.R. REP No. 1774, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The Senate report
for an earlier but similar bill is: S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936).
82. Only two subjects occurring during the debates even vaguely approach the question of restitution. The remarks made concerning them,
however, can have no effect on whether the Commission has the implied
authority to order restitution. The first is that of damages. On one occasion Senator Cummins declared:
This is not a statute intended to afford remedies in damages to those
who may be injured by wrongdoings of trusts and monopolies. ...
51 CONG. REC. 13050 (1914). The cases discussed below, however, clearly
show that administrative-ordered restitution is not an award of money
damages. See notes 111-35 infra and accompanying text.
The second issues is that of confiscation. On several occasions, Senators
Cummins and Newlands stated that an FTC order could not be "confiscatory
of property." 51 CONG. REC. 11108, 12217, 12220, 13007 (1914) (remarks of
Senator Newlands); 51 CONG. REC. 12988, 13007 (1914) (remarks of Senator
Cummins). Confiscation usually implies the taking of private property for
public use without fair compensation. Such a taking is unconstitutional as
a denial of due process. Zescherning v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); United
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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specifically rejected language which would have imposed criminal
penalties 3 and treble damage liability for violations of § 5V, However, omission of such penalties from the final bill should not
bar the FTC's use of restitution for three reasons. First, the
scope of a restitution order depends upon each individual fraud;
the wrongdoer's liability never exceeds the benefit he received.
Treble damages and criminal fines, on the other hand, usually
impose liability beyond the benefit received by the wrongdoer.
Second, courts are reluctant to infer congressional intent from deSuch reluctance should be parfeated bills and amendments."
States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949). Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 164, 178
(1796). That this concern for due process is at the heart of the statements
of Senators Cummins and Newlands is apparent from one verbal exchange:
Senator Cummins. I do not think the inquiry into confiscation
will often arise under the unfair competition section.
Senator Newlands. I do.
Senator Cummins. This is the question that will arise: Does the
order of the commission take the property of the complainant without due process of law . .?
51 CONG. REC. 13007 (1914).
This prohibition, however, cannot act as a bar to restitution. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and the cases which allow
administrative ordered restitution while distinguishing it from damages, see
notes 111 to 135 infra and accompanying text, though not directly addressed to
the issue, of necessity hold that an administrative restitution order is not a
confiscation. The same must be true of the Interstate Commerce Commission's orders. Since 1887 it has decreed reparations to parties injured
In
by violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
addition, the agency has, since 1910, ordered refunds for overcharges. 49
U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970). Thus, since the one statement regarding damages
and the several concerning confiscation are the closest that Congress came
to a discussion of restitution, the legislative record is free both of direct or of
any implied prohibitions and of any direct affirmations of restitutionary
authority.
83. Senator Newlands made it clear that in his opinion criminal penalties
were ineffective against unfair methods of competition. 51 CONG. REc. 12031
(1914).
A criminal penalty provision was expressly rejected by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives.
This rejection is apparent in both the committee report, H.R. REP. No.
1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), and in statements of congressmen during
the debates. See 83 CONG. REc. 394 (1938) (remarks of Representative
Keeney); 83 CONG. REC. 398 (1938) (remarks of Representative Reece); 83
CONG. REc. 395-96 (1938) (remarks of Representative Wolverton).
84. 51 CONG. REc. 13113-22, 13143-50 (1914) (treble damage amendment
proposed, debated and defeated: 18 yeas, 41 nays, 37 not voting).
85. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968);
FTC v. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597, 610 (1966); United States v. du Pont &
590-92Press,
(1957);
Co.,by353
U.S. 586,
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ticularly strong where the specific power in question was never
expressly considered by the draftsmen and where the power is one
which furthers the agency's mandated purpose." Finally, the

courts have
held that administrative ordered restitution is not a
8 '
"penalty."

At the least, Congress has indicated by creating an expert agency to enforce an exceptionally broad standard and by subjecting that agency to only limited review, 8 that the courts
are to approach the remedies fashioned by the FTC with the same
flexibility which is accorded the FTC's definitions of unfairness."'
Judicial authorities are not so equivocal on the question of
whether the remedial power of the FTC is broad enough to include
restitution. It is well settled that the FTC has wide discretion in
fashioning a remedy adequate to prevent an unfair practice and
that a reviewing court will not disturb an FTC order so long
as it is "reasonably related" to the prevention of the disclosed unfair trade practice." Indeed, the Commission's order can be broader
482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Cf. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 387 U.S. 397, 406-13 (1967); Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-48 (1950).
86. See notes 66-85 supra and accompanying text.
87. See notes 156-65 infra and accompanying text.
88. Section 5(c) of the FTCA provides for review of a final Commission
cease and desist order as follows:
(c)
Any person, partnership, or corporation required by an
order of the Commission to cease and desist from using any method
of competition or act or practice may obtain a review of such order in
the court of appeals of the United States, within any circuit where
the method of competition or the act or practice in question was
used or where such person, partnership, or corporation resides
or carries on business, by filing in the court, within sixty days
from the date of the service of such order, a written petition praying
that the order of the Commission be set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the
Commission, and thereupon the Commission shall file in the court
the record in the proceeding . . . . Upon such filing of the petition
the court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question
determined therein concurrently with the Commission until the filing
of the record and shall have power to make and enter a decree
affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order of the Commission,
and enforcing the same to the extent that such order is affirmed
and to issue such writs as are ancillary to the public or to competitors
pendente lite. The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.
FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970) (emphasis added). See note 44 supra and
accompanying text.
89. See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text.
90. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); FTC v.
Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 364 (1962); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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than particularities of the violator's unfair practice.
Supreme Court declared:

1

Thus, the

If the Commission is to obtain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its roadblock to
the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be
allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal,
so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity."2
As noted by one court, when the FTC forms an order it may
properly consider both "the nature and the character of the unfair
'
practice."93
It is even allowable to repress "those in utter disregard of law . . . by sterner measures than where the [violator's
conduct] could reasonably have been thought permissible.""
The FTC's wide remedial discretion includes the power to require an affirmative undertaking when necessary to prevent the
recurrence of an unfair practice. 5 Accordingly, the courts have
affirmed orders under § 5 requiring antitrust divestiture,' affirmative advertising disclosures,' mandatory licensing of patents,9"
and refunds to future victims of cease and desist order violations.9 9
These affirmative undertakings, like restitution, restore the
status quo and eliminate the incentive for future violations. Ordering a corporation which has nearly monopolized an industry to
cease and desist from further acquisitions hardly prevents the
U.S. 419, 428-30 (1957); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co.,
344 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1953); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473
(1952); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726-27 (1948); Jacob Seigel
Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946); Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d 700,
705 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Benrus Watch
Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 324 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 939
(1966); National Bakers Services, Inc. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir.
1964); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir. 1963). See FTC v.
Universal Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1967); Moog Industries, Inc. v.
FTC, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958);
Feitler v. FTC, 201 F.2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 814 (1953).
91. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952).
92. Id. at 473.
93. Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert denied,
362 U.S. 940 (1960).
94. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957), quoting from
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89-90 (1950).
95. See Luria Bros. Co. v. FTC, 389 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1968).
96. See note 13 supra.
97. See note 10 supra.
98. See note 14 supra.
Windsor
Distributing
Co. v. FTC, 437 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1971).
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continuing injury to competition which the monopolistic situation
causes. Nor does such an order make unfair acquisition less attractive to other businesses. Thus, divestiture, though not specifically
granted to the FTC in the FTCA, is a proper remedial order.' 0 It
should be noted that the Supreme Court has, in fact, analogized
divestiture to restitution, stating that:
Like restitution it merely deprives a defendant of the
gains from his wrongful conduct. It is an equitable
remedy designed in the public interest to undo what could
have been prevented had the defendants not outdistanced
the government in their unlawful project.0 '
For the same reasons an order which merely requires the false
advertiser to cease a deceptive promotion is inadequate. Unless
he is forced to disclose the truth about his product, both injury to
competitors and the incentive to advertise falsely in the future
continue. The incentive and the injury remain because the public
continues to compare his product with others on the basis of the
previous false claims. Again, while not specifically permitted by
the FTCA, an order requiring affirmative disclosure has been
held to be within the FTC's authority.' 2
The foregoing examination of the FTC's remedial power would
appear to place a restitution order clearly within the authority of
the Commission. Patent consumer fraud is a vicious matter. In
fashioning an order adequate to prevent the recurrence of an unfair
trade practice of this type, the FTC may properly consider the
severity of the violation. The FTC may even require an affirmative
undertaking to restore the status quo when the restoration of the
status quo is necessary to prevent the unfair acts or practice. As
shown above, only restitution is adequate to prevent the recurrence
of consumer fraud. Thus, because restitution is "reasonably related" to the prevention of the unfair practice and because its effects are similar to those of divestiture and affirmative advertising,
both of which have been judicially approved, the FTC's remedial
power should embrace restitution.
In summary, two valid arguments support the contention that
the FTC has the power to order restitution. The first, based on the
Commission's wide latitude in defining § 5 unfair practices, shows
100. See note 13 supra.
101. Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128
(1948). See note 65 supra.
102. See note 10 supra.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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that the fraudulent operator's unjust enrichment is itself an unfair
practice-one which is distinct from the original fraudulent misrepresentation. The second relies upon the broad remedial power
of the FTC. This latter argument demonstrates that a restitution
order is within the Commission's remedial power because only such
an order is sufficient to prevent future violations. The discussion
would end here, were it not for the fact that the courts have insisted upon certain additional requirements which must be met
for an FTC order to be held valid and enforceable.
RESTITUTION AND THE THREE REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAVE
TRADITIONALLY LIMITED THE COMMISSION'S ORDERS

Almost from the beginning of the FTC's existence, the
courts have required that the Commission's orders, to be valid,
must be non-compensatory, wholly prospective in effect, and nonpunitive.' 3 Underlying these limitations are the judicial desires
to ensure that the Commission will be able to accomplish its purpose and to protect the good faith violator.' 4 If the FTC had been
given the power to penalize violators under the broad fairness standard, reviewing courts probably would have hesitated to give the
Commission the wide discretion necessary for defining and preventing new methods of unfair competition, especially where the
actor had in good faith felt that he had acted legally. Also underpinning these judicial tests is the fear which led the framers to
adopt the § 5 (b)J prescription that FTC proceedings be initiated
in the public rather than private interest.' 5 That fear is that the
Commission may otherwise "becom[e] a clearing house to settle
the everyday quarrels of competitors free from detriment to the
103.

Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in FTC v. Gratz, is an early il-

lustration of this view:
[I]t is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the [FTC's] proceeding. The proceeding is not punitive. The complaint is not made with a
view to subjecting the respondents to any form of punishment. It
is not remedial. The complaint is not filed with a view to affording
compensation for any injury alleged to have resulted from the matter charged, nor with a view to protecting individuals from any such
injury in the future. The proceeding is strictly a preventative measure
taken in the interest of the general public.
FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 432 (1919) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

104. Id.
105.

The pertinent part of § 5(b) reads as follows:
(b) ... if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public ....
15 U.S.C.
§ 45(b)Electronic
(1970),Press,
as 1975
amended, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
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public, which should be adjusted through the ordinary processes of
the courts." ' 6 Because of these concerns, courts have repeatedly
stated that it is beyond the FTC's power to penalize a violator or to
order, involving private rights and liabilities, which, unlike an antiprior to an FTC determination that the conduct was an unfair
practice.'"
Viewing the FTC's power to define and to prevent unfair
trade practices in light of the non-compensatory, wholly prospective and non-punitive limitations, the Heater court struck down
the Commission's order. The court admitted that defining a fraudulent operator's unjust enrichment as unfair "reflects a not implausible construction of the Act." ' The broad remedial authority
of the Commission and the similarity in effect between divestiture
and restitution likewise were conceded by the court."0 9 Nevertheless,
the. court distinguished restitution on the ground that it is an
order involving private rights and liabilities which, unlike an antitrust divestiture, requires the violator to compensate victims who
were injured by an activity prior to a Commission determination
that the activity was unfair.'
Non-compensatory
Provided that the court in Heater was mistaken in assuming
that Congress felt § 5 was too vague for all but prospective application, the fact that consumers receive money back should not bar
the FTC from ordering restitution. It is well settled that the Commission cannot fix liability or exact compensation for past injury."'
But restitution, in the administrative law setting, serves a different
purpose than does an award of compensatory damages. An agency
restitution order, like an injunction, is an equitable remedy designed to prevent violations of law. The benefit to individuals is in106.

51 CONG. REC. 14930 (1914)

(remarks of Representative Coving-

ton).
107. See notes 111, 141, 156 infra and accompanying text.
108. 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. Id. at 324-25 n.13.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); Doyle v. FTC, 356
F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1966); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); Royal Baking Powder Co.
v. FTC, 281 F. 744, 745 (2d Cir. 1922); National Harness Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC,
268 F. 705, 712 (6th Cir. 1920). See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
Cf. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306, 311
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
(1963).
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cidental only. Compensatory damages, however, are intended to
give the injured party the benefit of his bargain.
Many courts have recognized that an administrative agency
ordering restitution in the public interest is not giving an award
for compensatory damages. When an order which returns to injured individuals the money paid to the violator is the only adequate means for preventing the recurrence of violations, courts
have upheld the order even though it incidentally compensates. As
stated by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bowles v. Skaggs : 2
An order of restitution is not a judgment for damages or
for penalties. It compels compliance and is restoration of
the status quo which falls within the recognized power of a
court of equity. * * * The Administrator acts in the public
interest-the purchaser in his own. The remedies are not
irreconcilable. There are undoubtedly many instances
where the relationship of buyer and seller is such that the
buyer is deterred from vindicating his own and therefore
also the public right. To deny to the Administrator power
to act in cases where, as here, restitution rather than a
prohibitory injunction is the only practical remedy, would
be to subvert the purposes of this Act." 3
In Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration (OPA) had sued in federal district court under his statutory
authority to seek "a permanent or temporary injunction or other
order." 1. To prevent sellers from overcharging for used goods, the
court granted restitution as requested by the Administrator.
The United States Supreme Court also has distinguished a
restitution order which is designed to eliminate the incentive to
violate the law from an award of damages. In Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,"' another OPA case, the Court declared that:
Restitution, which lies within th[e] equitable jurisdiction [of a federal district court], is consistent with and
differs greatly from the damages and penalties which may
be awarded under § 205 (e). . .. When the Administrator seeks restitution under § 205 (a) he does not request
the court to award statutory damages to the purchaser
. . . or to pay such person part of the penalties which go
112. 151 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1945).
113. Id. at 821
114. Id. at 819.
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to the United States Treasury in a suit by the Adminis-

trator under § 205 (e). Rather, he asks the court to act in
the public interest by restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the
purchaser or tenant."'
Thus, an administrative agency, at least one which enforces its
orders in a court of full equity jurisdiction, acts in the public interest and does not contravene the non-compensatory limitation by
issuing a preventative restitution order. It is worthy of note that
the Supreme Court has declared that an FTC order which incidentally benefits private individuals is valid and meets the public
interest requirement so long as the Commission's purpose for proceeding was to protect the public."'
116. Id. at 402.
117. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27 (1929).
The public interest requirement is not directly dealt with in the body
of this note for two reasons. First, the Heater court chose to address the
non-compensatory, non-punitive and prospective questions. In the interest of
clarity, the issues are framed as they were in the Heater opinion. Second,
courts have so loosely construed the public interest requirement that an
order for restitution, like almost every other Commission order, can pass
the prescription's strictures.
A brief survey of the development and present status of the public interest requirement reveals that there is a substantial public interest in decreeing restitution for patent consumer fraud. In Klesner, the United States
Supreme Court, affirming a lower court decision, but for another reason,
reversed an FTC cease and desist order. The basis of the decision was that
"Section 5 of the FTCA does not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs." Id. at 25. Accordingly, there was no substantial public interest in proceeding against a store owner who "largely
out of hatred and malice," id. at 28, set up a similar shop with a very similar
name and in the same place as that of a former tenant who, in violation of
his agreement with the store owner, had moved out of the store. On the way
to its decision, however, the Court intimated that Commission action is
justified even if private parties are benefitted so long as the "purpose [is
the] protection of the public." In such a case, "[t]he protection afforded
to private persons is the incident." Id. at 27.
Klesner also provides a few tests for "specific and substantial" public
interest.
To justify filing a complaint the public interest must be specific and
substantial. Often it is so, because the unfair method employed
threatens the existence of present or potential competition. Sometimes, because the unfair method is being employed under circumstances which involve flagrant oppression of the weak by the strong.
Sometimes, because, although the aggregate loss entailed may be
so serious and widespread as to make the matter one of public consequence, no private suit would be brought to stop the unfair conduct,
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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Subsequent to Bowles and Porter,the United States Supreme
Court has implicitly rejected the restitution-divestiture distinction
used by the Heater court as a reason for refusing to grant a request
for restitution when made by an agency having the authority to
petition a federal district court to "restrain" violations. In Mitchell
v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 8 the Court allowed the Secretary of Labor to seek restitution for violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA).1"9 Under the FLSA, the Secretary could ask
a federal district court to "restrain" violations. 2 ' The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a restitution order exceeded the Seesince the loss to each of the individuals affected is too small to warrant it.

Id. at 28.
Subsequent to Kles-ner, the view of what constitutes a public interest
worthy of protection has been amply expanded by the Supreme Court. See
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216-17
(1933). In particular, substantial public interest has been found in ridding
an industry of a competitor's deceptive practice which forces honest business to choose between employing the practice or suffering economically.
Algoma, supra at 78-79; FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 484 (1922);
National Candy Co. v. FTC, 104 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 610 (1939). There is also substantial public interest in depriving
a business of any competitive advantage acquired by deceptive practices.
See Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973) (divestiture); American Cynamid Co. v. FTC,
363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966) (mandatory licensing of patents). Cf. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (divestiture).
Finally, the FTC has been given wide discretion to determine whether a
proceeding brought by it is in the public interest and it has been stated that
each case must be determined on its own facts. Guziak v. FTC, 361 F.2d
700, 704 (8th Cir. 1966); FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744, 747
(7th Cir. 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
A restitution order against a fraudulent operator who has affected a
substantial portion of the public passes these tests. As held by Bowles and
Porter, administrative ordered restitution is a vindication of public rights
and only incidentally of private rights. In addition, such an order often aids
consumers to combat widespread use of oppressive practices which cause a
large aggregate loss, but only small individual losses. Finally, a restitution
order preserves and protects fair competition in two ways. First, the
honest competitor is freed from choosing between adopting his dishonest
competitor's methods or losing business. Second, any unfairly obtained
competitive advantage is dissipated. Thus, a restitution order which attacks
a patent consumer fraud involving a significant portion of the public is in
the "specific and substantial" public interest.
118. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
119. Fair Labor Standards Act § 17, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
120. Id.
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retary's statutory authority."'
Relying on United States v.
Parkinson,2 ' the appellate court reasoned that the power to sue for
restitution must be authorized either expressly or by strong implication." 3 Central to Parkinson,a case in which the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare was denied the power to sue for
restitution, was the distinction between divestiture and restitution.
Parkinson had distinguished restitution on the ground that a party
ordered to divest himself of property sells the property, receiving
compensation for it while a party under a restitution order
must give the property away."2 4 Noting that "the court below" decided the case on "the principle that . . . the jurisdiction here
contested 'must be expressly conferred by an act of Congress or be
necessarily implied from a congressional enactment,'" the Supreme
25
Court reversed, declaring: "In this the court was mistaken."'
Althoug it did not expressly discuss the point, the Court necessarily
rejected the validity of the Parkinson divestiture-restitution distinction.
Even though the FTC is obviously not a court of equity, and is
not required, unlike the OPA and the Secretary of Labor, to invoke
the equitable jurisdiction of a federal court in order to enforce an
order, the reasoning of Bowles, Porter and Mitchell is applicable
in the FTC setting. In the first place, as will be demonstrated in the
next subsection, Congress did not feel that the unfairness standard
was too vague for retrospective liability.' 26 The type of fraudulent
operator who is subject to a FTC restitution order typically should
know that he has acted unlawfully, as did the employer in Mitchell
who fired an employee for filing a grievance, or the landlord in
Porterwho overcharged a tenant. Moreover, the pertinent remedial
language of the FTCA and the FLSA bear a close resemblance Both
Acts provide for some kind of injunctive relief. The Secretary of
Labor can sue to "restrain" violations 2 " and the FTC can order a
violator to "cease and desist."'' A restitution order in the FTC
setting is akin to an injunction inasmuch as both seek to prevent
violations of the law: restitution by being the only remedy adequate
121. 260 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958).
122. 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956).
123. Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 260 F.2d 929, 933 (5th Cir.
1958), rev'd, 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
124. 240 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1956).
125. 361 U.S. 288, 290 (1960).
126. See notes 139-55 infra and accompanying text.
127. Fair Labor Standards Act § 17, 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
128. FTCA, 15 U.S.C. §45(b)
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to prevent blatant consumer fraud; and an injunction which is
adequate to prevent many other types of unlawfulness. Finally, and
most importantly, though it does not operate in conjunction with a
court having equitable powers, the FTC has been exhorted to carry
out its defining and remedial roles in the same manner as would a
court of equity. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,'2 the Court
compared the Commission's defining activity with the work of a
court of equity." ° In addition, the Court while passing on the
remedial powers of the CAB under § 411 of the Federal Aviation
Act, which is modeled after § 5 of the FTCA, held that the agency's
cease and desist power was broad enough to include divestiture.'3 '
One of the bases of this decision was the Court's analogizing the
power of administrative agencies to fashion appropriate relief to
the power of the judiciary in framing an injunctive decree.'3 2 Since
both the CAB and the FTC enforce an "unfairness" standard, and
have identical cease and desist powers, there is little room to argue
that the FTC does not have the same equitable power to fashion
orders adequate to prevent violations of the FTCA that the CAB
possesses to prevent violations of the Federal Aviation Act. Additionally, all FTC decisions are appealable to federal circuit courts
of appeals,' 3 which are, of course, courts of full equity jurisdiction."' Thus, the FTC with its equitable powers should, like the
Secretary of Labor and the OPA, not be barred from ordering
restitution either on the ground that a restitution order compensates
injured victims, or on the ground that restitution is distinguishable
from divestiture because, in the words of the Heater court, "private
rights and liabilities are involved."' 5
Prospective Only
Along with the benefit to injured consumers which incidentally
results from a restitution order, the Heater court also objected to
the retroactive nature of the liability imposed by such an order.' 6
Citing the legislative history of the FTCA and the purely prospective effect of the FTC's cease and desist power, the court concluded
that the power to order restitution varied so greatly with the
129. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
130. Id. at 244.
131.

(1963).
132.
133.

Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296

Id. at 312 n.17.
FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). See note 88 supra.

134. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939).

135. 503 F.2d 321, 324-25 n.13 (9th Cir. 1974).
136. Id.
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"educational" purpose of the FTC that only a clear indication of
legislative intent could validate the existence of the power.'" Such
reluctance to imply so necessary a power is unwarranted in the light
of Pan Am and other cases noted in the discussion of the Commission's remedial power.'38 The court's hesitancy is especially unjustified in view of the 1914 debates on the FTCA.
Underlying the conclusion in Heater that Congress intended
the Commission's orders to be prospective only are several items
taken from the legislative history. On the ground that "Congress
rejected an amendment which provided a private damage suit based
on a Commission finding of a violation of the Act," the court argued
that Congress had,
withheld from the Commission the power to make a determination which would expose the businessman to liability
for acts occuring before the Commission gave the general
definition specific meaning in a factual context.""
Secondly, the Heater court contended that "out of reasonable fair
notice considerations," Congress chose to provide the FTC with
sanctions having only prospective effect.' 0 This conclusion was
reached from statements of senators who, in the court's view,
were concerned that,
a businessman would be unable to determine whether a
particular practice was made unlawful until the Commission and courts gave the general language specific sub4 1
stance.
137.
138.

Id. at 323-24.
See notes 66-102 supra and accompanying text.

139.

503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974)

(emphasis added).

140. Id. at 321, 324-25 n.13.
141. Id. at 324, citing 51 CONG. REC. 13114 (1914)

(remarks of Senator

McCumber).

For prior decisions which state that the FTC's order relates to the
future and is not to fasten liability on respondents for past conduct, see
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333
U.S.

683, 706 (1948); Doyle v. FTC, 356 F.2d 381, 383 (5th

Cir. 1966);

Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 322 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 939 (1966); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765

(3d Cir. 1963);

Erickson v. FTC, 272 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 362 U.S. 940
(1960); Drath v. FTC, 239 F.2d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 917 (1957); P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950);
American Chain & Cable Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir. 1944); Standard Container Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 119 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1941); United

Corp. v. FTC, 110 F.2d 473, 475-76 (4th Cir. 1940).
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But a careful reading of the entire 1914 debates refutes the
court's assumption that Congress considered the § 5 unfairness
standard to be too vague for all but prospective relief. The private
damage suit which Congress rejected was one for treble damages.'42
Senator Newlands opposed the treble damage amendment on the
ground that the highly punitive nature of threefold liability too
greatly varied from the Commission's purpose.'
Senator Newlands
did, however, favor an amendment to the treble damage provision
which struck "treble" and inserted "actual."'" The actual damage
amendment was proposed by Senator McCumber,' 5 the Senator
cited in Heater for having misgivings about the broadness of the
standard which the Commission was to enforce. Contrary to the
Heater court's assertion, the actual damage amendment was not
"rejected" by Congress. Rather, it was never voted on because
Senator McCumber withdrew his amendment.' 6 The probable
reason for the withdrawal and for the failure to repropose it
after the treble damage amendment had been voted on was that
many senators, including Senator McCumber, felt that such an
amendment was superfluous.'
The amendment was considered
unnecessary because many senators were,
certain that [without the amendment] an action would lie
[for violation of the Act] immediately by any person
aggrieved in a civil action to recover simple damages for
whatever injury he had sustained through the unlawful
acts of a competitor." 8
It is worth noting that Senator McCumber ultimately voted for a
treble damage amendment which would have allowed a treble
damage action on practices which the Commission had previously
142. See note 84 supra.
143. See 51 CONG. REC. 13149 (1914).
144. 51 CONG. REC. 13113-14 (1914).
145. 51 CONG. REC. 13117 (1914) (Senator McCumber proposed actual
damage amendment to treble damage amendment).
146. 51 CONG. REC. 13148 (1914).
147. See 51 CONG. REC. 13145 (1914) (remarks of Senator Clapp); 51
CONG. REC. 13104 (1914) (remarks of Senator Brandegee); 51 CONG. REC.
13145 (1914)
(remarks of Senator Clarke); 51 CONG. REC. 13054, 13147
(1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins); 51 CONG. REC. 13158 (1914) (remarks of Senator Kenyon); 51 CONG. REC. 13148 (1914) (remarks of Senator McCumber); 51 CONG. REc. 11602, 13054 (1914) (remarks of Senator
Newlands) ; 51 CONG. REC. 13146, 13058 (1914) (remarks of Senator Shields);
51 CONG. REC. 13117, 13120 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
148. 51 CONG. REC. 13148 (1914) (remarks of Senator McCumber).
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determined to be unfair. 4'9 Although an opponent of the FTCA,"0
he apparently felt that § 5, at least under these circumstances, was
not too broad even for the retroactive imposition of a penalty such
as treble damages.'5
Further support for the contention that Congress considered
the § 5 standard to be sufficiently well defined to serve as a ground
for the recovery of damages, is provided by the conference committee's deletion of a proviso in the Senate's version of the FTCA.
The unapproved sentence would have prohibited the use of any,
order or finding of the court or commission in the enforcement of [§ 5 as] evidence in any suit, civil or criminal,
brought under the antitrust acts.'5 2
Immediately prior to the Senate's passage of the pre-conference
version of the FTCA, Senator Reed had attacked the proponents
of § 5 for including this proviso."' He argued that by refusing to
allow the decisions of the Commission to be prima facie evidence
in a court case involving third parties, the Act's proponents admitted that § 5 was too vague.
In light of Congress' enactment of a law which was deemed
to give rise to an action for actual damages and Congress' removal
of an obstacle to such suits, it is difficult to believe that Congress
considered § 5 to be too vague for retroactive application. Thus, the
authority to order restitution when such an order is necessary to
prevent violations of § 5 should not be denied the FTC on the
ground that a restitution order imposes retroactive liability without
fair notice."' In the future, however, the importance of the notice
149. 51 CONG. REC. 13150 (1914).
150. 51 CONG. REC. 14771 (1914).
151. See notes 160 and 161 infra and accompanying text.
152. 51 CONG. REC. 14923 (1914) (Senate's pre-conference version of the
FTCA).
153. 51 CONG. REC. 13233 (1914).
154. Commissioner Dixon's Curtis Publishing Co. decision embodies
the FTC's attack on the retrospective requirement. (1970-1973 Transfer
Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP.
19,719 (FTC 1971). Therein the Commission explains:
With respect to the . . . conclusion that any type of restitutionary relief would run afoul of the requirement that cease and desist
orders must be wholly prospective in operation, it seems questionable
whether the purported distinction between "prospective" and "retrospective" relief is a useful analytical construct for determining
whether a particular type of provision is permissible. Every Commission order is "retrospective," in the sense that it looks to and is
based upon the causes and results of the acts found to violate the
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question will be minimal. Because the FTC has recently received
substantive rule-making power, it can now specify beforehand
those activities which will draw a restitution order.155 One last
hurdle, the requirement that a restitution order be non-penal,
remains to be cleared.
statute, and at the same time it is "prospective" in the sense that its
design, purpose, and effect is to dissipate any lingering effects of the
past violations and to prevent their recurrence in the future. In reality, the "prospective/retrospective" formulation seems based upon
concern that the Commission in structuring its orders might go beyond
the bounds of what is reasonably necessary to eradicate the violations
found to exist, and impose requirements that are in essence punitive
because they are superfluous.
Id. The Ninth Circuit, based upon its reading of the congressional debates,
however, was not persuaded by the Commission's argument.
A direct assault on the applicability of the prospective-retrospective distinction to FTC-ordered restitution should prove more effective than an attack
on its viability. Although Commissioner Dixon's analysis is consistent with
the divestiture-restitution analogy, the prospective-retrospective dichotomy has
long been a part of administrative law. See, e.g., Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB,
87 F.2d 146, 151 (5th Cir. 1936). Further, Heater seems to be correct
when it concludes that considerations of fair notice underlie the prospective
requirement, at least where penalties, such as treble damages, are concerned. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324-25 n.13 (9th Cir. 1974). See 51
CONG. REc. 13118 (1914) (remarks of Senator Clapp); 51 CONG. REC. 13114,
13115, 13117 (1914) (remarks of Senator McCumber); 51 CONG. REC. 13118,
13119 (1914) (remarks of Senator Williams); 51 CONG. REC. 13120 (1914) (remarks of Senator Reed). Thus, the Commission's line of attack must counter both tradition and legislative history.
By contending that the dichotomy is not applicable to restitution for
consumer fraud, tradition is left in tact and partial legislative history is
overcome with fully reviewing the record and with considering the practicalities of FTC-ordered restitution. A complete survey of the legislative
history reveals that many of those who debated the FTCA considered its
standard adequate for retrospective civil liability. See notes 142-48 supra
and accompanying text. If § 5 was thought to provide sufficient notice for
private damage actions, it certainly must do so for restitution. In any
case, the FTC's recently acquired substantive rule making power, its years of
defining unfair practices, and the flagrant character of the practices which
draw restitution orders combine to eliminate almost any uncertainty that
could exist. This solid legislative history in conjunction with the clear unlawfulness of consumer fraud should dispose a court to not apply, or to not
apply strictly the prospective requirement. Such should be the result even
where the court is not ready to discard completely the prospective-retrospective dichotomy.
155. 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1970);
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
See note 167 infra and accompanying
text.
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Non-punitive
The courts have made it clear that an order which imposes a
penalty lies beyond the authority of the Commission. 5 ' A FTC
order cannot be punitive because the Commission's purpose is to
protect the public by preventing violations of the Act, not to punish
the wrongdoer for his past acts.' 7 Noting that the Heater corporations were insolvent or nearly so, and that the money retained by
them was only "constructively" retained, the Heater court asserted
that "[t] he impact of the refund order in the present case illustrates
the reason Congress did not give the Commission the power it seeks
to exercise."''5 8 The legislative history of the FTCA and court decisions, however, indicate that a restitution order should not be
considered a forbidden "penalty."
Although Congress never discussed restitution in the 1914 and
1937-38 debates,'5 9 the statements of the Act's proponents and
opponents reveal that by "penalty" was meant a harsher order than
one which seeks to prevent future violations by eliminating the
incentive to act unfairly. When the framers spoke of a penalty they
referred to a fine or imprisonment.' ° A person who violated the

Sherman Antitrust Act, or a court's injunction, or who was subjected to liability beyond actual damages in a treble damage action,
was "penalized."' 6 ' But restitution is distinguishable from these
decrees. Criminal punishment entails the exaction of a monetary
156. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 706 (1948); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1, 24
(7th Cir. 1971); Doyle v. FTC, 356 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1966); Benrus
Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313, 322 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 939 (1966); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963);
United Corp. v. FTC, 110 F.2d 473, 476 (4th Cir. 1950); Gimbel Bros. v.
FTC, 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941); California Lumberman's Council
v. FTC, 115 F.2d 178, 184 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 709 (1941).
157. See note 156 supra.
158. 503 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1974).
159. See notes 81 and 82 supra.
160. See 51 CONG. REc. 11186, 11597, 11598 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah); 51 CONG. REC. 11533-34 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins);
51 CONG. REc. 13001 (1914) (remarks of Senator Hollis); 51 CONG. REC.
11112, 12027, 12217 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands); 51 CONG.
REC. 11235 (1914) (remarks of Senator Pomerene); 51 CONG. REc. 11533
(1914) (remarks of Senator Norris); 51 CONG. REC. 14788 (1914) (remarks of
Senator Reed) ; 51 CONG. REC. 11591 (1914) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury);
51 CONG. REc. 12277 (1914) (remarks of Senator Works); 80 CONG. REC.
6591 (1936) (remarks of Senator Wheeler); 83 CONG. REc. 395, 396 (1938)
(remarks of Representative Wolverton).
161. See note 160 supra.
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sum which is not limited in amount to the value of the benefit
received by the wrongdoer. The purpose of an FTC restitution order,
on the other hand, is not to deter illegality by exacting "smart
money," but to prevent future violations of § 5 by removing a
positive incentive to violate. Because of this difference in nature
between restitution and the criminal sentences which the framers
considered to be penal, restitution should not be deemed a penalty,
as that term was used by the framers of the FTCA.
The courts, too, have distinguished between an administrative
restitution order and a penalty. Both Porterand BowIes held that a
restitution order did not constitute a penalty.'62 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that restitution is not a penalty, but,
like divestiture, is an equitable remedy which seeks only to deprive
the lawbreaker of the gains from his unlawful conduct.' 3 Restitution orders are designed to restore the pre-violation status quo and
to prevent further violations of the law. As long as a restitution
order in this manner furthers the public interest, it is not considered
a penalty.
The contention that a restitution order is not a penalty is
further supported by an analogy to an award of compensatory
damages. Although restitution and compensatory damages are dissimilar in their purposes and in their measures of the award, they
are alike in one aspect. Under both, the award never exceeds some
measure of the value of the actual injury to the aggrieved party.
The fact that many courts'" and the First Restatement of Conflicts' 5 distinguish compensatory damages from a penalty strengthens the distinction between restitution and penalty. Thus, both the
legislative history and judicial decisions imply that an administrative restitution order is not a penalty.
162. See notes 112-17 supra and accompanying text. See Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943); Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB,
87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936).
163. See Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110,
128 (1948).
164. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324 (1914); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1892); United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611
(1880) ; United States v. Witherspoon, 211 F.2d 858, 860-61 (6th Cir. 1954) ;
American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 833 (10th
Cir. 1949) ; Stevenson v. Stoufer, 237 Iowa 513, 21 N.W.2d 287, 288 (1946) ;
Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607, 613 (1941) ; Forsyth
v. Central Foundary Co., 240 Ala. 277, 198 So. 706, 709 (1940); Roller v.
Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S.E. 172, 174 (1912); Great Western Machine Co.
v. Smith, 87 Kan. 331, 124 P. 414, 415 (1912).
RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS
OF LAWS § 611(a) (1934).
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Summarizing this section, an examination of legislative and
judicial authorities reveals that restitution is not prohibited by
the non-compensatory, prospective-only and non-penal limitations
of the FTC's remedial authority. Restitution, though it may benefit
consumers incidentally, is not compensatory because the purpose of
a restitution order is the vindication of the public interest. Nor
can restitution be considered compensatory on the ground that it,
unlike divestiture, involves personal monetary liability. Careful
reading of the legislative history of the FTCA also reveals that the
prospective requirement cannot bar the FTC from ordering restitution. While restitution does attach liability retroactively, the
prospective-only rule poses no obstacle because the reasoning underlying the concept collapses under the weight of a careful analysis
of the 1914 legislative history. In addition, the Commission's
recently acquired substantive rule making power and the flagrant
character of the violations which will draw a restitution order
mitigate against strict application of the prospective-only rule.
Finally, the preventative remedy of restitution is not a penalty
either in the eyes of the FTCA's framers nor in those of the
judiciary. Even though the Commission apparently has the implied
power to order restitution, the uncertainty in the case law and
recognition that the FTC needs stronger consumer protection
devices have caused stirrings on Capitol Hill in recent years.
RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY REGARDING
THE COMMISSION AND

RESTITUTION

Enactment of Title II of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act' 6 on January 4, 1975,
culminated six years of effort by Congress and the Commission to
improve the agency's consumer protection capability. Although the
Act provides a consumer redress provision whereby the FTC brings
actions in court, no restitution provision was included. On the
contrary, there have been unsuccessful attempts by the Commission
and some members of Congress to grant the Commission express
authority to make any order, including restitution, which the FTC
considers to be necessary. The years of debate have also left a
conglomeration of what appears on the surface to be conflicting
statements concerning the FTC's authority to order restitution.
These as of yet ill-fated appeals for express congressional authorization, and the enactment of the consumer redress provision which
utilizes the courts, and the seemingly contrary statements conceivably could give rise to the contention that the FTC is precluded from
166. 88 Stat. 2193 (1975),
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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asserting restitutionary power. Congress, however, in the Magnuson-Moss Act, disavowed any influence one way or the other and
specifically left the question of § 5 restitution to the judicial
process. In addition, any adverse implications arising from the two
other grounds for a binding-construction argument, the agency's
statements and the unsuccessful attempts in Congress to acquire
explicit restitution authority, are silenced by compelling decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Improvement section of
the Act, the Commission receives both new powers and codification
and refinement of older ones.' 67 The most pertinent section is the
167. The new authority which the FTC Improvement Title gives the
Commission, substantially improves the agency's consumer protection capability. Section 201 expands jurisdiction from "in commerce" to "in or affecting commerce." 88 Stat. 2193 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The
scope of the Commission's investigative authority is also increased. Section
203 strikes "corporation," where it appears in § 6 of the FTCA, and inserts
"person, partnership, or corporation." 88 Stat. 2198 (1975), amending 15
U.S.C. § 46(a) (1970). Furthermore, civil penalty actions for up to $10,000
per violation may now be brought by the FTC in federal district courts
against any person, partnership or corporation who knowingly use or used
any act or practice which the Commission had determined to be unfair either
through a rule or a final cease and desist order. 88 Stat. 2200 (1975),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). Although actual knowledge is required
where a cease and desist order to which a person is not a party has been
violated, objectively tested knowledge is sufficient for liability where a rule
has been transgressed. Id. Also new is the consumer redress provision which
is discussed in note 168 infra and the accompanying text.
In addition to granting new authority, the Act alters the formerly held
power of self-representation in court. The FTC received a limited right to be
represented in court by its own attorneys in 1973. 87 Stat. 591, 592 (1973),
15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. 1973). This privilege is greatly expanded by the
Magnuson-Moss Act. Now the agency has exclusive jurisdiction to represent
itself in civil actions pertaining to injunctive relief, consumer redress, judicial
review of rules and cease and desist orders, and enforcement of subpoenae
and other authorized information gathering. 88 Stat. 2199-2200 (1975),
amending 15 U.S.C. § 56 (1970) and repealing 87 Stat. 591, 592 (1973), 15
U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. 1973). Furthermore, such authority may be acquired
in other situations, including review by the United States Supreme Court. Id.
The Commission's substantive rulemaking authority is also refined by
the 1975 Act. In National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), the FTC was found to
possess substantive rulemaking authority. With such rules the agency could
declare particular acts or practices to be unfair under § 5 without an adjudication. So long as the Administrative Procedure Act's informal rulemaking procedures were followed, these rules had the force and effect of law. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970). Under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the Commission is now expressly
authorized to promulgate both interpretive and substantive rules. 88 Stat.
15 1975
U.S.C. § 57(a) (1970). Although the informal
amending
2193-98
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consumer redress provision. 6 This section empowers the FTC to
initiate civil actions for redressing injury to consumers and others
in two situations: first, where any Commission rule declaring an
activity an unfair or deceptive act or practice is violated; second,
where a party has committed an act or practice which no Commission rule has proscribed, but which has been determined to be
unfair or deceptive by a Commission cease and desist order applicable to the party." In this later situation, however, the Commission
must "satisf [y] the court that the act or practice to which the
cease and desist order relates is one which a reasonable man would
have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent. .. ."" To make this remedy more effective, Congress further provided, subject to two minor limitations, that the Commission's findings of material facts "with respect to any rule violation
or act or practice" subject to a final cease and desist order "shall
7
be conclusive."' '
This type of consumer redress mechanism has been termed a
"modest step" and represents a compromise between those who
oppose using the FTC as a means for consumer redress and those
who favor expressly granting the authority to order restitution.'
Since 1970, various bills reflecting these positions have received
congressional consideration. 7 A few of the subcommittees which
rulemaking procedure is generally retained, many elements of an on-therecord hearing are required where the Commission determines that there is a
disputed issue of fact. Other changes include a provision for judicial review

of rules, subjecting banks to the Commission's rulemaking jurisdiction, and
compensating certain persons whom fairness requires be represented in the
rulemaking proceedings but otherwise could not afford to be. Id.
168. 88 Stat. 2201-02 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1970).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172.

See 117 CONG. REC. 39860 (1971)

(remarks of Senator Spong).

173. S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (subsequently amended and
enacted as Magnuson-Moss Act) (authorized both court action and action by
Commission alone); H.R. 7917, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (subsequently
amended and enacted as Magnuson-Moss Act) (neither court action nor
Commission ordered redress authorized) ; H.R. 20, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
(neither FTC ordered restitution nor FTC court action authorized); S. 986,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (both court action and action by Commission alone
authorized) ; H.R. 4809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (identical to S. 986);
S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (consumer class action-as reported by
committee, Commission authorized to initiate actions in court only); H.R.
14585, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (consumer class action for certain enumer-

ated violations of § 5; no authorization either for FTC ordered restitution or
for FTC court actions on behalf of injured consumers).
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held the hearings may have favored allowing the FTC to act on
its own.'' But, the full committees,'7 5 with one exception, 7 6 and
the two houses of Congress have preferred either to require the

FTC to work through a court,'17 or else, that the agency not con78
cern itself with remedial action at all.
During the course of the extended debate, statements were
made regarding the FTC's authority to order monetary consumer
redress which, at the outset, seem to conflict. The 1970 subcommittee hearings on S. 3201 and H.R. 14931 are replete with statements
by Commissioners requesting the power to award damages to
injured consumers, and bemoaning the inadequacy of a cease and
desist order to deal with consumer fraud. The ineffectiveness of the
cease and desist order is blamed on its prospective application,
which renders it unable to assess money damages. Thus, on
February 4, 1970, then Chairman Caspar Weinberger declared:
The Commission . . . believes that it needs stronger
and more comprehensive tools to make the threat of a
Commission proceeding a real deterrent to a lawbreaker.
Specifically, * * * the Commission should be empowered
to award damages where consumers have been injured by
acts or practices found by the Commission to be in violation
of the law."'
Similarly, on December 17, 1969, Commissioner Philip Elman
railed against the "toothless""'8 cease and desist order, "hav174. See Hearings on S. 3201 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., serv. 91-48. pt. 1, at
118-19 (1970) (remarks of Subcommittee Chairman Moss) [hereinafter cited
as 1970 Hearings on S. 8201]; S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1971) ; H.R.
4809, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1971).
175. S. REP. No. 92-269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (reporting S. 986);
S. REP. No. 91-1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (reporting S. 3201).
176. S. REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (reporting S. 356).
177. See 119 CONG. REc. 29490 (1973)
(Senate passes S. 356); 117
CONG. REc. 39876 (1971) (Senate passes S. 986).
178. 120 CONG. REC. H 9404, H 9406 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1974) (House
defeating Representative Eckhardt's amendment to H.R. 7917 which would
have allowed Commission to initiate actions in court to redress aggrieved
consumers, and subsequently passing H.R. 7917 without such a provision).
179. Hearings on H.R. 14931 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., ser. 91-43, at 54-55 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings on
H.R. 14931] (emphasis added). The same or a very similar statement by
Chairman Weinberger appears two other times. 1970 Hearings on S. 3201,
pt. 1, at 9, pt. 2, at 242-43.
180.
1970 Hearings
on S.1975
8201, note 174 supra, pt. 1, at 60.
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ing only a prospective effect."' 8 ' Statements by Commissioners
Dixon,'8 2 Jones' and the FTC Chairman Miles W. Kirkpatrick8
are to the same effect.
Congress too has asserted that, with the prospective cease and
desist order as the Commission's only sanction, no specific redress
can be afforded to consumers injured by unfair or deceptive practices.' 5 In 1970, Senator Moss suggested that:
The Commission should have greatly expanded enforcement powers in order to prevent fraud and deception
and to remedy injuries caused by such practices. Its powers
should include . . . the power to remedy the damage to
injured consumers, by ordering rescission, restitution, or
payment of damages.'
During floor debate on S. 986, a bill which, as reported by committee, would have authorized the Commission to initiate consumer
actions in court, but would not have specifically authorized the FTC
to, of its own, order redress, Senator Moss in 1971 stated:
the Federal Trade Commission having found that there is
a deceptive or fraudulent practice of some sort and having
issued a cease-and-desist order may go into court-not
decide on its own-to establish that damage has occurred
by that action to a number of consumers and that, therefore, they will be able to receive a recovery.""
Even as recently as 1973, Senator Magnuson, while introducing to
the Senate the committee version of S. 356, which would have
empowered the FTC to provide any specific remedial relief to
consumers which the Commission would deem necessary, declared:
this bill would allow the Commission to order specific
redress for injured consumers; no longer would it have to
rely merely upon a slap of the violator's wrist to maintain
181. Id. at 58.
182. Id. at 39, 42-44.
183. Id. at 105.
184. Hearings on H.R. 4809 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 92-50, at 198 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings on
H.R.4809].
185. S. REP. No. 91-1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9, 24 (1970); 117
CONG. REC. 39859 (1971) (remarks of Senator Spong).
186. 1970 Hearings on S. 3201, note 174 supra, pt. 1, at 118 (emphasis
added).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
187. 117 CONG. REC. 39860 (1971) (emphasis added).
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fair play in the marketplace, and, if the Commission
pursues the matter, the consumer may have his injury
made whole. A mere cease-and-desist order has frequently
let a wrongdoer keep his ill-gotten gains.'88
Thus, both FTC Commissioners and legislators have indicated, at
one time or another, that the Commission does not have the authority under § 5 to order damages or specific redress for the benefit
of aggrieved consumers.
Yet other FTC actions and communications with Congress
indicate that the Commission feels that it already has the authority
to order restitution as part of a cease and desist order. It was in
1970 that the proposed order requiring restitution was issued in
Heater."9 That same year, a hearing examiner denied the Commission's request for a restitution order against the Curtis Publishing
Company.' ° In 1971, the leading Commission restitution opinion
appeared-Curtis Publishing Company' '-written by Commissioner Dixon. With regard to its communications with Congress, a 1971
letter from Chairman Kirkpatrick to Senator Cook concerning S.
986 states:
We also believe, as previously stated, that the explicit
confirmation of our remedial powers, such as restitution
and recission, is a matter of importance ...
.
Similarly, a 1972 letter to Representative Moss from Charles Tobin,
the FTC Secretary, regarding comparable legislation declares:
the Commission's law enforcement effort has for too long
been hampered by the strict limitations which permit
remedial sanctions only in a severely limited number of
oases.'

93

One explanation for this seeming conflict in opinion might be
that the Commissioners distinguish between a general damage
188. 119 CONG. REC. 29480 (1973) (emphasis added).
189. Universal Credit Acceptance Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder)
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,340 (FTC 1970).
190. (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. REP. 19,376, 78
FTC 1472, 1475-1507 (FTC 1970).
191. Curtis Publishing Co., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE

REG. REP. 1[19,719 (FTC 1971), 78 FTC 1472, 1507-25 (1971).
192. Hearings on S. 986 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 92-8, at 67 (1971) (emphasis
added).
193. 1971 Hearings on H.R. 4809, note 184 supra, at 386 (emphasis
added).
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action and the equitable remedies of restitution and rescission
where needed to dissipate the effects of an unfair or deceptive act
or practice. Such a distinction is clearly present in a 1970 questionand-answer exchange between Representative Keith and Commissioner Jones:
Mr. Keith. Can the Federal Trade Commission with
its present authority and on its own initiative move into
some of the areas that are delineated in this legislation
(H.R. 14931) ?
Miss Jones. Do you mean we can ask for damages for
consumers? No. Can we ask for recission of a contract?
We tried it in one case. We don't know whether the courts
are going to sustain it ....
If the Commission was, in fact, distinguishing between damages
and a § 5 restitution order back in 1970 and 1971 when these statements were made, then its position at that time is not contrary
to its present assertions. Should this be the case, there is little
ground for arguing that the FTC has precluded itself by prior
statements from now claiming restitution authority. Since the just
quoted and seemingly negative congressional statements arose out
of or subsequent to the hearings in which the Commissioners failed
always to make the damages-restitution distinction clear, it is likely
that they are subject to the same analysis to which the Commissioners' statements are.' 95
Congress, too, has indicated that it recognizes a distinction
between awards of damages to consumers and administrative restitution. The Senate Committee on Commerce eliminated from the
original version of S. 986 a provision which would have explicitly
authorized the FTC to order any additional relief which the Commission might deem necessary. Yet in the portion of the Committee
Report commenting on the provision of S. 986 which would have
empowered the Commission to initiate actions in court for aggrieved
consumers, the Committee stated:
This section would not affect whatever power the
Commission may have under section 5 to fashion relief
in its initial cease-and-desist order, such as corrective
advertising or any other remedy, which may be appropriate to terminate effectively unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. [This section of S. 986] is applicable to those
194.

1970 Hearings on H.R. 14931, note 179 supra, at 93.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
195. Compare notes 179-84 supra with notes 185-88 supra.
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situations where the Commission acts to make specific
consumers whole and not to general actions designed to
dissipate the prior effects of unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.'
It is noteworthy that the statement of The National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM) in the subcommittee hearings on H.R.
4809, a bill identical to S. 986, interpreted the above quotation as
a recognition of Commission authority to fashion remedies like a
court of equity.'97 The NAM, of course, denied that the Commission
has such implied power."9 More recently, Representative Moss,
during the 1974 floor debate on H.R. 7917, declared:
I would also point out that this amendment [which
would authorize the FTC to initiate actions in court for
consumer redress] does not deal with the Federal Trade
Commission's own powers to order restitution in section
5 proceedings. It deals only with the Commission's power
to bring actions in court on behalf of defrauded customers.
The question of the Commission's own powers is now
before the courts and is not affected by this amendment." " '
Thus, both Congress and Federal Trade Commissioners have decried the prospective-only effect of the cease and desist order and
the Commission's lack of authority to do more than slap violators'
wrists by ordering damages or other specific redress. Yet, at
other times, Commissioners and Congressmen indicate that the
FTC may be empowered to order restitution as part of a cease
and desist order.
Despite the apparent lack of support for expressly authorizing
the FTC to order specific consumer redress, those Congressmen
who acknowledge a difference between § 5 restitution and damages
awards have left their mark on the Magnuson-Moss Act. In the Act,
Congress expressly left the question of FTC-ordered restitution to
the courts. The section which authorized the Commission to seek
consumer redress in court also contains the following provision:
(e) Remedies provided in this section are in addition
to, and not in lieu of, any other remedy or right of action
196.

S. REP. No. 92-269, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 25 (1971)

(emphasis

added).
197. 1971 Hearings on H.R. 4809, note 184 supra, at 459.

198. Id.
REc. Press,
H 9404
120 CONG.
Produced by199.
The Berkeley
Electronic
1975(daily ed. Sept. 19, 1974) (emphasis added).
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provided by State or Federal law. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect any authority of the Commission under any other provision of law.2 °
The conference committee report, adopted by both houses of Congress,20 ' explains this provision:
The authority of the Commission to seek consumer
redress encompassed by the Conference substitute deals
exclusively with civil actions brought by the Commission
and relief granted by the courts in those actions. The section is intended to supplement the ability of the Commission to redress consumer and other injury resulting from
violations of its rules or of Section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and is not intended to modify or
limit any existing power the Commission may have to
itself issue orders designed to remedying violations of the
law. That issue is now before the courts. It is not the intent
of the Conferees to influence the outcome in any way. 2
With these words, the Conference Committee has put to rest any
argument that because Congress considered the grant of restitutionary authority and rejected it in favor of actions in court for
consumer redress, the Commission does not have such power. The
inclusion of this disclaimer and the explanation it receives can
only be accounted for as the anticipation and rejection by friends
of the FTC of the argument that Congress construed § 5 as not
encompassing restitution. This analysis is supported by the fact
that the Conference Committee was composed of such FTC supporters as Senate Managers Magnuson, Moss, Hart and Stevens, and
House Managers Moss and Eckhardt, some of whom have indicated,
by previous statements, recognition of the distinction between
§ 5 restitution and consumer damage actions.2 " By accepting the
conference reports, the two houses of Congress imprinted this
distinction into the record.

200. 88 Stat. 2183, 2201-02 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 57(b) (1970).
201. 120 CONG. REc. S. 21990 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (Senate agrees to
S. REP. No. 93-1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), conference report on S. 356,
Magnuson-Moss Act); 120 CONG. REc. H 12349 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1974)
(House agrees to H. REP. No. 93-1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), conference
report on Magnuson-Moss Act).
202. 120 CONG. Rac. H 12052, H 12064, H 1206A (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974),
(setting forth in full the conference committee report on S. 356-H.R. 7917.
H. REP. No. 93-1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
203. See notes 196 and 199 supra and accompanying text.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
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With Congress having clearly indicated that enactment of the
Magnuson-Moss Act's consumer redress provision was not to effect
the outcome of the § 5 restitution question, neither the contrary
statements by Congressmen and Commissioners nor the unsuccessful bids for formal authorization create an insurmountable obstacle to judicial affirmation. On several occasions, the United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged novel agency authority
despite prior administrative claims that such authority was not
possessed. Such has been the case even where congressional authorization had been unsuccessfully sought. In American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., °4
the Court recognized that public policy requires agencies be free to
seek congressional action. Disposing of the contentions that the
Interstate Commerce Commission's twenty-five years of contrary
interpretation and two unsuccessful attempts to gain similar legislative authorization constituted dispositive administrative interpretation and congressional construction, the Court declared:
The advocacy of legislation by an administrative agencyand even the assertion of the need for it to accomplish a
desired result-is an unsure and unreliable, and not a
highly desirable, guide to statutory construction. The possibility of its use to prove more than it means ... should
not ... deter administrative agencies from seeking helpful clarification of authority or a fresh and specific con20 5
gressional mandate.
Recognizing that "flexibility and adaptability to changing needs
and patterns of [regulated activity] is an essential part of the
office of a regulatory agency,"2 6 the Court held:
the Commission, faced with new developments or in light
of reconsideration of the relevant facts and its mandate,
may alter its past interpretation and overturn past administrative rulings and practice.""
On other occasions the Court has followed and elaborated on
the principles which it found controlling in American Trucking.2
204. 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
205. Id. at 418.
206. Id. at 416.
207. Id.
208. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1967).
In Southwestern Cable, the Federal Communications Commission's authority
to regulate cable television was affirmed. This judicial approval was forthcoming despite two unsuccessful attempts at explicit Congressional authoriza-
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One such case is Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath."' Wong Yang Sung
involved the Immigration Service petitioning Congress to exempt
deportation proceedings from certain requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Such a bill had been proposed but not
voted on in one session of Congress. Congress failed to complete
the legislative process despite its awareness that the Service had
construed the Act so as to exempt such proceedings. The Court,
refusing to conclude either that the Service was or that it was not
exempted on the ground of the legislative request and the subsequent incomplete activity, ruled:
We will not draw the inference . . that an agency admits
that it is acting upon a wrong construction by seeking
ratification from Congress. Public policy requires that
agencies feel free to ask legislation which will terminate
or avoid adverse contentions and litigations.2
From an examination of the cases it is apparent that the Supreme
Court favor allowing administrative agencies to be flexible and responsive to changing societal needs and developments, as well as
encouraging agencies to avoid litigation by seeking clarifying legislation. The policies will be furthered even when to do so the Court
must go against prior administrative interpretations and must
draw no inference from unsuccessful or incomplete attempts to
acquire congressional approval of the disputed power.
The FTC, too, has benefited from the Court's reluctance to
imply from contrary statements by administrators and unsuccessful or incomplete legislative action that an agency cannot assert
novel but necessary authority. In United States v. du Pont & Co.,'
the Court found that the Commission could proceed against vertical
as well as horizontal acquisitions. This decision was made in spite
of thirty-five years of FTC inaction against vertical acquisitions,
FTC statements that the pertinent statute did not apply to vertical
acquisitions, and FTC sponsorship of a bill to include clearly such
tion: in the first, six years prior to issuance of the disputed regulation, the
Commission stated that it "did not intend to regulate CATV;" the second
request, coming one year after the regulation was issued, asked Congress to
"confirm the [the Commission's] jurisdiction" to so regulate. Id. at 170, 171.
Subsequently, Southwestern Cable was cited by the Court as authority for
the proposition that "subsequent legislation usually is not entitled to much
weight in construing earlier statutes ...

505 n.25 (1972).
209. 339 U.S. 33 (1949).
210. Id. at 47.
211. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4

"

Matz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,

et al.: Restitution for Consumer Fraud Under Section Five of the Federal
19761

RESTITUTION FOR CONSUMER FRAUD

acquisitions. In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court was
guided both by legislative history which aided and supported its
construction of the Act and by its "duty to reconcile administrative
interpretations with the broad . . . policies laid down by Congress."2 '2 Again, in United States v. Morton Salt Co.,"12 the issue of
novel authority arose. Refusing to draw an adverse inference, the
Court dealt with the issue in the following manner:
Respondents . . . say that the present use of the asserted
power is novel and unprecedented. . . . Respondents are
not without statements by the Commission or its officials,
dicta from judicial opinions, views of text writers and
facts of legislative history which give some support to
this theory. But this court never before has been called
2 14
upon to deal consciously and squarely with the subject.
Thus, even where the FTC has disclaimed certain authority, has not
used it for many years, and has unsuccessfully petitioned Congress
to grant that authority, the Court will acknowledge it where societal changes require that the Commission be given it in order to
accomplish the broad policy for which the agency was created.
In light of the foregoing considerations, there exists little
reason for denying the Commission the authority to order restitution under § 5. Congress has clearly stated that no adverse implications may arise from enactment of the Magnuson-Moss Act's
consumer redress mechanism. Also present are the factors to
which the Supreme Court has looked when disregarding unsuccessful or incomplete congressional activity and practice, assuming
arguendo that the Commission's statements do not distinguish between restitution and damages, and thus are inconsistent with
present assertion of authority. Previously discussed legislative history reveals Congress' policy of using the Commission to protect
consumers from unfairness." 5 Also apparent in the legislative and
judicial history is the broad and equitable scope of § 5.2"1 This
broad and equitable nature both aids and supports a § 5 restitution
construction.2 " Underlying the development of § 5 restitution is
212. Id. at 590. It should be noted that the du Pont opinion was quoted
and followed in FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966). For the Dean

Foods holding, see note 73 supra and accompanying text.
213. 338 U.S. 632 (1949).
214. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
215. See notes 25 to 34 and 40 to 52 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 41 to 61, 67 to 80 and 100 to 102 supra and accompanying
text.

217. Id.
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the growth of the consumer society and concern for consumer wellbeing. Restitution is a flexible and imaginative response to that
modern problem-a response which the Supreme Court has never
specifically addressed. Finally, to deny § 5 restitution authority
on the basis of prior administrative statement and unsuccessful
sponsorship of legislation would be contrary to the public policy
of encouraging administrative agencies to avoid litigation by
seeking confirming or clarifying legislation from Congress. Thus,
the argument that a controlling administrative interpretation
and congressional construction deny § 5 restitution authority to
the Commission is untenable.
Summarizing, the Magnuson-Moss Act and the debate generated by it and similar bills should have little, if any, effect adverse to the Commission's position on the final judicial resolution of the § 5 restitution question. There is ample evidence that
"contrary" administrative and congressional interpretations referred to damages, not restitution. In addition, the Act itself disclaims any influence one way or the other. Finally, the Supreme
Court has evidenced a strong aversion to precluding administrators
from asserting novel authority which, because of societal changes,
is needed to further the agency's purpose. This policy of fostering
administrative flexibility and responsiveness has been advanced
even where similar powers were unsuccessfully sought from Congress, and where prior agency interpretation and practice are contrary to the later position. With the possibility of the courts
granting the FTC the authority to order restitution, consideration
must be given to the question of priorities within the agency itself
and the extent to which administrative restitution should be a
part of consumer protection.
THE PROPRIETY OF THE

FTC

HAVING

RESTITUTION AUTHORITY

In order to evaluate the propriety of giving the FTC the authority to order restitution, one must recognize that the Commission
has a law enforcement function as well as an educational function.
By investigating, publicizing, rendering advisory opinions and
making rules about unfair trade practices, the FTC teaches both
businessmen and consumers about the different types of unfairness proscribed by § 5. However, the FTC is also charged with the
enforcement of the FTCA itself, various antitrust acts,"1 ' and
218. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a).
13(b), 21(a) (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1970).
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other consumer legislation.'
Critics of the restitution proposal
fear arbitrary harassment of legitimate business by the imposi2
tion of retrospective liability,"
and for this reason wish to confine the FTC to the role of educating and prohibiting.2 ' Proponents, viewing the FTC as a law enforcement agency operating
in the public interest, do not want the Commission's purpose to be
frustrated by the wrongdoer who wilfully cheats consumers.2 22
Because future violations by a recalcitrant defrauder of consumers will not be prevented by a cease and desist order, the FTC
needs the authority to order restitution if it is more fully to protect the public from this unfair deprivation. Thus, thp issue is
not whether it is desirable for the Commission to have the power
to order restitution. Rather the question is how great a role the
FTC should play in the overall scheme of judicial and administrative
consumer protection, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the exercise of restitutionary power by
an administrative agency.
The propriety of granting the power to the FTC depends upon
a balancing of several considerations. On the one hand, the Commission's and the public's need for the new power, as well as the
capability of the FTC to wield it effectively, must be considered.
On the other hand, the adverse impact on the FTC in carrying out
other responsibilities, the detrimental effects upon the personal
liberties of individual respondents, the disadvantages of the growth
of government, and alternative means for preventing consumer
fraud and remedying its victims, also, require attention.
Strong reasons exist for granting the FTC the power to order
restitution. The public needs a swift and effective machinery to
prevent consumer fraud. Because of cost, ignorance, unfavorable
laws and unsympathetic prosecutors and judges, few consumers
obtain relief from the courts and hence few fraudulent operators
are deterred.2" Due to the cost and difficulty inherent in bringing a separate action in the courts subsequent to a Commission
proceeding, even the new consumer redress provision of the Magnuson-Moss Act cannot provide the deterrent effect which FTC
ordered restitution can. The Commission is especially well suited
219. See note 53 supra.
220. See, e.g., 1971 Hearings on H.R. 4809, note 184 supra, at 378-79.
221. See, e.g., Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
222. Letter from Paul R. Dixon, Federal Trade Commissioner, to Eric L.
Freise, Nov. 18, 1974, on file Valparaiso University Law School Library.
223. See Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into
Effective
for Protection,
Produced
by The Programs
Berkeley Electronic
Press, 1975 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 396-97 (1966).
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to police large interstate operations, where problems of jurisdic22 '
In addition, the swift
tion and cost would otherwise be great.
and inexpensive prevention of a type of unfairness which the
courts have been unable to deal with is in the finest tradition of
the FTC.225
Whether the Commission can protect the public by exercising
restitutionary power without injuring the agency's ability to carry
out its other responsibilities becomes a question of resources. The
FTC has the expertise, the in-house counsel, the information, and
can have the funds that the private citizen and the local court
do not.2 2 6 It is noteworthy that Congress made a generous appro22
priation to the FTC in the Magnuson-Moss Act. ' Yet it is impossible for the Commission to act on more than a handful of the many
consumer frauds perpetrated each year. In 1970, Senator Tydings
estimated that consumers may lose more than ten billion dollars
per year through consumer fraud in the sale of shoddy goods and
services. 8 In order to meet stricter standards of proof and to
calculate and disperse judgments, a greater amount of resources
will be required. FTC estimates made in 1971 indicate that the
increased cost resulting from the enactment of a law which would
enable the Commission to initiate suits in federal district courts
2 9 If Congress does not appropriate this
would be substantial.
money, the FTC will be forced to take resources from other projects
or to hold only an empty promise for consumers. One long standing complaint of Commissioner Dixon, former Chairman of the
FTC, is that Congress creates new responsibilities for the Commis23
sion but then does not adequately fund them.
224. See note 222 supra.
225. See notes 40-52 supra and accompanying text.
226. See note 223 supra and accompanying text.
227. 88 Stat. 2183, 2203 (1975), amending 15 U.S.C. § 57(c) (1970)
($42 million for fiscal year 1975; $46 million for fiscal 1976; and $50 million
for fiscal 1977).
228. 116 CONG. REc. 3116-17 (1970).
229. Although the estimates vary considerably, either amount is significant. In a December 20, 1971 letter to Representative Moss, Chairman Kirkpatrick anticipated an annual cost increase of $1,056,000 resulting from Title
II of H.R. 4809. 1971 Hearings on H.R. 4809, note 184 supra, at 208. However, Senator Cook revealed some other estimates from the FTC concerning
Title II of S. 986, a bill indentical to H.R. 4809. According to his figures, "it
will cost $725,000 the first year, $875,000 the second year, $1 million the third
year, $1,250,000 the fourth year, and $1,400,000 the fifth year." 117 CONG.
REC. 39854 (1971).
230. 1970 Hearings on S. 3201, note 174 supra, at 38, 46-47; 1971 Hearhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/4
ings on H.R. 4809, note 184 supra, at 202; Hearings on S. 986 Before the Con-
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The public's need for protection from consumer fraud must
also be balanced against the possible injury to the violator's civil
liberties. Such a consideration chiefly involves a choice of the
forum. Should a violator potentially subject to restitution receive
a courtroom jury trial or a summary administrative proceeding?
The United States Supreme Court has held that neither due
process nor trial by jury rights are denied by an administrative
agency which makes an essentially equitable order pursuant to its
statutory duties.2 3 ' This is the case even where the common law
affords a right to trial by jury. Nevertheless, both the court in
Heater"2 and Congress.. have shown uneasiness with the Commission's procedure as a means of adjudicating personal monetary liability. Even FTC sympathizers have stated that the combined role
of investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury "imposes intolerable
strains on fairness."2 ' But when the Commission orders restitution, it acts as executioner too.
The alternative methods for providing consumer protection
must also be considered. Merely because the courts and local law
enforcement agencies have been unable to deter consumer fraud
and to remedy injured consumers3 5 does not mean that the responsibility and the necessary power be turned over to an agency
of the federal government. A better solution might be for the Commission to assist states and local governments in creating and
maintaining new laws and tribunals which not only provide easy
remedies for a defrauded consumer but which also make fraudulent
operators amenable to prosecution and punishment. In fact, bills
which would allocate $95 million over three years to the FTC for
the purpose of providing such assistance to local governments are
presently before the Senate and House.22
Another bill evidencing
simer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
92-98, at 36 (1971).
231. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 46-48 (1937).
Accord Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146, 151 (5th Cir. 1936).
232. 503 F.2d 321, 325-26 (9th Cir. 1974).
233. See notes 172-78 supra and accompanying text.
234. P. Elman, The Regulatory Process-A Personal View, appearing in
Hearings on the Nomination of Miles W. Kirkpatrick, to be Chairman of the
FTC, Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-88,
at 152 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Nomination Hearings].
235. See Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into
Effective Programsfor Protection,114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 396-97 (1966).
236. S. 2928, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 13830, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); Jt. Hearings on S. 2928 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce and the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizens
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this view has been introduced by Senator Moss."" His proposal
would authorize state and certain local jurisdictions to enforce
orders and regulations that the FTC has issued prohibiting unfair
practices. Furthermore, many developments have occurred in the
area of consumer protection, including the creation of small claims
courts, consumer arbitration panels, and restitution for consumers
through state attorneys general." 8 The successful experience under
the Truth-in-Lending Act (TIL)2 9 argues well for the proposition
that the development of local self-help methods should be encouraged. After one year of Truth-in-Lending, a FTC staff found
relatively high compliance.
Federal Reserve Board Governor
J. L. Robertson noted that the consumer enforcement through civil
suits is essential to maintaining this high compliance rate. ' The
ABA in its report on the FTC, chaired by Miles Kirkpatrick, also
has indicated its belief in the efficacy of private enforcement by
advocating the creation of a private consumer cause of action for
§ 5 violations. 2
Upon examination of the factors which must be considered
in evaluating the propriety of the FTC ordering restitution, it is
suggested that the American consumer will receive greater protection if the FTC's reme:dial authority plays only a limited role
in the total effort against consumer fraud. While the Commission
is best suited for attacking large inter-state operations, it cannot
possibly police all the fraud perpetrated throughout the country.
Moreover, the administrative machinery necessary to undertake
such a task would be extremely burdensome and unwieldy. Traditionally, the jury has served as a check on arbitrary governmental
Interests of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-85
(1974) ; S. REP. No. 93-1164, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
237. 121 CONG. REC. S 1758 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1975) (remarks of Senator Moss-introducing and placing in RECORD complete text of S. 642, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
238. See Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357
(1972); Wade & Kamenshine, Restitution for Consumers: Making the Remedy
Effective through Suit by Governmental Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1031
(1969); Note, FraudulentAdvertising: The Right of a Public Attorney General to Seek Restitution, 4 PAC. L.J. 168 (1973).
239. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970).
240. Truth in Lending Compliance Study, FTC Division of Special

Projects.
241. 118 CONG. REC. 14824-25 (1972).
242. Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission, at 63 (1969), appearing in 1970 Nomination Hearings,note 234, supra,
at 71.
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action. As long as adequate judicial methods can be developed
which insure easy court access and fairness for all parties, the constitutional right to trial by jury should not be lightly relinquished.
Attacking the problem with the state and local judiciary has the
added advantages which come from encouraging citizens to protect themselves. If it is appropriate to draw lessons from the history of TIL and of several regulatory agencies, local self-help
methods should be preferred because they will not only effectively
reduce consumer fraud but will also insure that consumers' interests will not in the future be relegated to secondary importance as a
consequence of the ever-changing forces operating on Capitol Hill.
The Commission's expertise and information gathering ability can
be a great aid to state and local governments attempting to develop
and operate forums for consumer protection. Thus, the proper
role would be for the Commission itself to handle the larger and
more blatant consumer frauds, while assisting local government in
developing and operating consumer protection procedures for the
vast majority of lesser consumer frauds.
CONCLUSION

This note contends that the FTC has the authority to order
restitution in cases of consumer fraud. Congressional and judicial
definitions of "unfairness" reveal that the fraudulent seller's retention of consumer money is itself an unfair practice. Examination of congressional and judicial authorities also demonstrates
that when the Commission orders restitution to prevent consumer
fraud, the FTC not only acts within the broad remedial authority
given by Congress, but concurrently accomplishes the very purpose for which Congress created it.
None of the three requirements which have traditionally limited the FTC's remedial power makes a restitution order improper
as long as the order is necessary to prevent the unfair practice of
consumer fraud. First, the courts have distinguished between an
administrative restitution order issued in the public interest and a
forbidden award of compensatory damages. Secondly, because the
reasoning which underlies the prospective-only doctrine is based
on a misapprehension of congressional intent, this limitation should
not be used to deny the FTC the authority to order restitution.
Finally, both congressional and judicial utterances indicate that au
administrative restitution order should not be deemed a penalty.
Thus, for the reasons that restitution is within the FTC's broad
powers both to define and to remedy unfair practices, and because
such authority is not barred by the three judicial limits imposed
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upon FTC orders, restitution is a proper remedy for consumer
fraud.
Congress' recent action indicates that it too recognizes the
necessity for providing the FTC with new methods for preventing
consumer fraud. Although the hesitancy of Congress to expressly
grant the FTC the power to orier restitution will not preclude
courts from implying it, a concern with the disadvantages of investing the agency with such power is nevertheless revealed. In view
of problems involving limited resources, the constitutional requirements of procedural due process and the improbability of achieving
long term efficacy, it is suggested that restitution be only a minor
portion of the FTC's attack on consumer fraud. The FTC should
move against major consumer fraud schemes in order to develop a
comprehensive enforcement policy, but at the same time, its role
of assisting local governments in protecting consumers must be
greatly expanded.
Heater v. FTC is the only court decision on the restitution
issue. Another Commission restitution order was appealed to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, this appeal was dismissed upon petitioner's motion.2 43 The question is surely bound
for the United States Supreme Court. The Commissioners are
determined in their position: not only did they vote to appeal
Heater to the Supreme Court, " but they have ordered restitution
in several cases subsequent both to Heater,"' and to the MagnusonMoss Act's enactment. "6 However, passage of the Magnuson-Moss
243. Universal Electronics Corp., (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) CCH
TRADE REG. REP. %19,979 (FTC 1971), appeal dismissed, No. 71-1187 (8th
Cir. Aug. 19, 1971).

244. See note 222 supra. See also Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 20,757 n.11 (FTC 1974).
245.

Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.

20,757 (FTC 1974),

modified, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,819 (FTC 1975); Weaver Airline
Personnel School, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,756 (FTC 1974); Fuque
Industries, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. %20,755 (FTC 1974); Soundtrack
Chevell Industries, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. %20,771 (FTC 1974) (complaint docketed).
The Commission has also expressly manifested its intention to continue
ordering restitution in other circuits. Letter from David H. Williams, Attorney, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Eric L. Freise, Nov. 26, 1974, on
file Valparaiso University Law School Library.
246. Lear Siegler, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,938 (FTC 1975);
Maralco Enterprises, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
20,890 (FTC 1975);
Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,859 (FTC 1975);
Kustom Enterprises, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,824 (FTC 1975);
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Act appears to have taken away the urgency which the Commission
feels for vindicating its position. " " Thus, it has decided not to appeal
Heater and consequently has vacated the restitution provision of
an order against a Ninth Circuit respondent.2 ' Yet in doing so,
the Commission plainly stated that it has not changed its view
"regarding the correctness of the Heaterdecision." Hopefully, when
the United States Supreme Court does decide the issue, the decision
will stand with others which have followed the framers' intent by
allowing § 5 to meet changing societal needs.

Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 120,902 (FTC 1975)
(initial decision); Soundtrack Chevell Industries, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG.

REP. 120,880 (FTC 1975) (Commission denies administrative law judge's
recommendation to withdraw case from adjudication for consent order negotiations); Genesco, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,819 (FTC 1975) (complaint docketed).
247. See Holiday Magic, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,819 (FTC
1975).
248. Id.
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